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The  rapid  growth  in  wage  inequality  and  the  rising  incidence  of  low  earnings  in  the 
1980’s  can  be  traced  in  large  part  to  the  sharp  decline  in  the  real  hourly  wages  of  low- 
skill  men.  This  paper  examines  alternative  explanations  for  this  wage  collapse.  A 
widely  accepted  story  is  that  this  collapse  reflected  declining  demand  (job  opportuni- 
ties)  for  low-skill  jobs,  a  consequence  of  biased  technological  change.  The  result  was 
skill  mismatch:  too  few  low-skill  jobs  for  the  low-skill  workforce.  The  evidence  de- 
scribed  in  this  paper  offers  little  support  for  this  hypothesis;  while  substantial  shifts  in 
the  skill  mix  of  employment  took  place  between  1973  and  1983,  there  was  little  skill 
restructuring  after  1983.  Crucially,  however,  it  was  in  this  latter  period  that  we  observe 
the  highest  rates  of  investment  in  computer-based  technologies  by  firms  in  all  sectors 
of  the  economy.  An  alternative  “shifting  wage  norms”  explanation  is  proposed.  A 
survey  of  the  evidence  suggests  that  many  employers  began  to  adopt  low-wage 
human  resource  strategies  in  the  late  1970’s.  These  employment  practices  under- 
mined  traditional  wage-setting  institutions  (collective  bargaining,  internal  labor  market 
norms)  that  had  protected  low-skilled  workers  from  the  full  force  of  labor  market 
competition.  In  addition,  these  practices,  together  with  unprecedented  increases  in  the 
supply  of  low-skill  foreign  workers,  resulted  in  a  massive  increase  in  the  effective 
supply  of  labor  competing  for  low-skill  jobs.  These  developments  led  to  a  collapse  of 
wages  at  the  bottom  of  the  wage  distribution,  a  collapse  facilitated  by  a  25  percent 
decline  in  the  real  value  of  the  legal  minimum  wage  in  the  1980’s. After  rising  for  almost  three  decades,  the  average  real  weekly  earnings  of  produc- 
tion  and  nonsupervisory  workers  fell  by  7.5  percent  between  1973  and  1979  and  by 
another  12.6  percent  between  1979  and  1990.  In  1982  dollars,  the  weekly  wage  was 
$327  in  1973,  $303  in  1979,  $277  in  1982,  and  just  $265  in  1990.’  This  considerable 
drop  in  the  value  of  the  average  production  worker  paycheck  has  coincided  with  a 
spectacular  increase  in  earnings  inequality  (Levy  and  Murnane,  1992;  Juhn,  Murphy 
and  Pierce,  1993).  Indeed,  the  most  highly  publicized  characteristic  of  recent  earnings 
trends  has  been  been  the  widening  gap  between  highly  educated  and  poorly  educated 
workers. 
Table  1  summarizes  real  earnings  trends  since  1973  by  gender  and  educational 
attainment  for  full-time  year-round  workers  from  the  March  Current  Population  Survey 
files.  The  Table  shows  that  the  wage  restructuring  of  the  last  two  decades  consisted  of 
two  fundamental  developments.  First,  the  real  earnings  of  college  educated  female 
workers  in  the  1980’s  grew  rapidly  (14  percent)  in  the  1980’s.  The  second  and  even 
more  dramatic  trend  was  the  massive  decline  in  the  earnings  of  poorly  educated  men 
-  down  25  percent  for  those  with  less  than  a  high  school  and  down  16  percent  for  men 
with  just  a  high  school  degree  since  1973.  As  the  table  shows,  while  real  earnings  for 
these  workers  fell  in  the  1970’s,  the  percentage  declines  were  3  to  4  times  larger  in 
the  1980’s,  a  decade  in  which  the  average  earnings  of  college  educated  workers  in- 
creased  modestly.  The  increase  at  the  top  appears  to  be  due  exclusively  to  the 
increased  earnings  of  those  with  post-graduate  schooling.  Average  earnings  for 
individuals  with  just  a  college  degree  actually  fell  by  2.3  percent.2 
‘Average  weekly  earnings  (Economic  Report  of  the  President,l991,  Table  B-44) 
were  deflated  by  the  CPI-U  index  (Table  B-58). 
2This  last  figure  is  for  the  1979-91  period  (Mishel  and  Bernstein,  Economic  Policy 
Institute,  cited  in  the  New  York  Times,  December  13,  1993,  p.  Dl). -2- 
Table  1 
Changes  in Real  Earnings  By Demographic  Group,  1973-89 
(FUN-Time Year-Round  Workers) 
Gender/Years  of Schooling 
Men  1973-79  1979439  1973439 
O-11  -5.1  -19.6  -24.7 
12  -4.1  -11.3  -15.5 
13-15  4.4  -2.8  -7.1 
16+  -7.3  4.9  -2.4 
Women 
O-11  4.1  -5.9  -1.8 
12  2.8  1.5  4.2 
13-15  .5  7.1  7.6 
16+  -1 .Q  14.1  12.2 
Source:  Maury  Grttleman,  “Changes  In the  Structure  of tarnrngs  rn the  1980’s:  An 
Occupational  Perspective,”  unpublished  (Bureau  of Labor  Statistics),  1993. 
These  data  indicate  that  it  was  the  sharp  drop  in  the  earnings  of  low-skilled 
men  that  was  primarily  responsible  for  the  growth  in  male  earnings  inequality 
across  education  groups  in  the  1980’s.  This  downward  wage  restructuring  also 
meant  that  fewer  low-skilled  workers  could  rely  on  wage  earnings  to  keep  a  family 
out  of  poverty.  Acs  and  Danziger  (1993)  report  that  the  incidence  of  “low  earnings,” 
defined  as  the  poverty  line  for  a  family  of  four,  doubled  between  1979  and  1989  for 
employed  male  high  school  graduates,  rising  from  8  to  15  percent;  for  men  with 
only  some  high  school,  the  share  of  the  employed  workforce  with  poverty-wage 
earnings  increased  from  13  to  30  percent.  The  problem  of  low-earnings  was 
substantially  worse  for  black  and  Hispanic  men:  25  percent  of  all  employed  black 
men  and  41  percent  of  all  employed  Hispanic  men  with  less  than  a  high  school 
degree  earned  poverty-level  incomes  in  1989,  far  above  their  1979  levels  (Acs  and 
Danziger,  1993:Table  3). 
While  supply-side  changes  appear  to  provide  a  reasonably  good  account  for -3- 
the  modest  wage  growth  observed  for  well-educated  men  in  the  1980’s,3  there  is 
no  consensus  on  the  reasons  for  the  collapse  at  the  bottom.  Perhaps  the  single 
most  widely  accepted  explanation  is  skill  mismatch  -  that  there  was  a  fundamental 
shift  in  the  mix  of  skills  required  in  the  workplace  which  caused  a substantial 
decline  in  demand  for  low-skill  workers.  The  growing  mismatch  between  the  skills 
demanded  by  firms  and  those  supplied  by  the  workforce  reduced  wages  and 
increased  joblessness  among  the  low-skilled.  Chinchui  Juhn  (1992:99),  for  exam- 
ple,  infers  from  declining  real  wage  and  labor  force  participation  trends  that  “job 
market  opportunities  have  .  .  .  deteriorated  significantly  for  less-skilled  workers.” 
Similarly,  Juhn,  Murphy  and  Pierce  (1993:437)  write  that  the  “fall  in  wages  for  the 
least  skilled  is  symptomatic  of  a fall  in  demand  for  low-wage  workers”  and  con- 
clude  that  “There  are  simply  too  few  low-wage  jobs....“’  The  current  Secretary  of 
Labor,  Robert  Reich,  citing  evidence  of  rising  shares  of  poverty-wage  workers  and 
growing  wage  inequality,  has  written  that  there  is  a  “mismatch  between  the  skill 
Americans  have  and  the  skills  the  economy  requires....  The  long-term  crisis  in  ad- 
vanced  industrial  nations  reflects  in  part  a  shift  in  relative  labor  demand  against 
less-educated  workers  and  those  doing  routine  tasks  and  toward  workers  with 
problem-solving  skills”  (1993). 
A  widely  accepted  explanation  for  this  shift  in  the  demand  for  skills  is  techno- 
logical  change  in  the  workplace.  In  an  influential  paper,  Bound  and  Johnson 
(1992:371)  assert  that  the  “major  cause  (of  relative  wage  changes  in  the  1980’s) 
was  a  shift  in  the  skill  structure  of  labor  demand  brought  about  by  biased  techno- 
3Citing  the  work  of  Blackburn,  Bloom  and  Freeman  (1990)  and  Kosters  (1992), 
Burtless  (1992)  states  that  “The  supply  of  highly  skilled  workers  more  than  kept  pace 
with  demand  through  the  1970’s,  when  the  wage  premium  for  schooling  shrank 
slightly.  But  the  anemic  growth  of  a  highly  skilled  labor  supply  in  the  1980’s  led  to  a 
sharp  rise  in  the  premium  for  education  and  skill.” 
’  As  the  last  quotation  suggests,  “low-wage”  workers  are  frequently  viewed  as 
synonymous  with  “low-skill”  workers  in  the  recent  empirical  literature  (see  the  introduc- 
tion  to  Section  1). -4- 
logical  change.”  Similarly,  Acs  and  Danziger  (1993:632)  conclude  that  since  most 
of  the  decline  in  earnings  is  found  within  industries  for  workers  with  the  same 
education  and  experience  levels  and  cannot  be  accounted  for  by  the  standard 
measures  used  in  earnings  studies,  “changes  in  technology,  whether  autonomous 
or  in  response  to  foreign  competition,  provide  the  most  plausible  explanation  for 
the  fall  in  mean  earnings.”  Neither  of  these  studies  attempted  to  directly  test  this 
proposition,  but  recent  papers  by  Allen  (1993)  and  Berman,  Bound  and  Griliches 
(1993)  have  done  so,  finding  that  technological  change  helps  to  explain  recent 
wage  trends  (Allen)  and  skill  upgrading  (Berman,  Bound  and  Griliches)  in  manu- 
facturing  industries. 
The  beauty  of  the  technology-induced  skill  mismatch  explanation  is  its  simplici- 
ty  -  it  is  a  straightforward  application  of  a  simple  demand  and  supply  model  in 
which  relative  wages  reflect  relative  skills.  It  is  also  consistent  with  a  wealth  of 
anecdotal  evidence  on  the  skill  upgrading  effects  of  computer-based  workplace 
technologies  (although  there  is  also  counter  evidence  -  see  below).  As  Diagram  1 
shows,  a  decline  in  demand  for  low-skilled  workers  caused  by  the  introduction  of 
new  technologies  can  be  expected  to  lead  to  lower  wages  and  declining  employ- 
ment  for  low-skill  (low-wage)  workers.  With  no  change  in  the  supply  schedule, 
declining  job  opportunities  imply  rising  joblessness. 
Diagram  1  Diagram  2 
Declining  Demand  With  Skill  Restructuring  Declining  Demand  Without  Skill  Restructuring 
Wl 
w2 
E2  El  Low-skill  employment 
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El  Low-skill  employment -5- 
There  is,  however,  another  literature  that  has  attempted  to  explain  the  growth 
in  male  wage  inequality  with  little  or  no  reference  to  skill  restructuring.  This  body  of 
research  has  focused  on  the  statistical  relationship  between  a  variety  of  potentially 
relevant  factors  and  relative  wage  trends.  These  factors  range  from  underlying 
determinants  (trade),  to  proximate  causes  (union  strength),  to  developments  that 
have  merely  facilitated  the  downward  wage  trends  (the  value  of  the  minimum 
wage).  For  example,  Borgas,  Freeman  and  Katz  (1992)  find  that  low-skill  immigra- 
tion  and  trade  are  together  responsible  for  30-50  percent  the  growth  in  wage 
inequality.  Borgas  and  Ramey  (1993)  conclude  that  the  effects  of  foreign  trade  on 
high-wage  workers  in  concentrated  durable  goods  industries  is  the  primary  driving 
force  behind  the  rise  in  wage  inequality  throughout  the  economy,  although  the 
mechanism  through  which  this  took  place  is  left  unclear.  According  to  other 
studies,  declining  union  strength  and  the  drop  in  the  real  value  of  the  minimum 
wage  together  explain  some  (Blackburn,  Bloom  and  Freeman,  1990)  or  almost  all 
(DiNardo,  Fortin,  and  Lemieux,  1993)  of  the  shift  in  relative  wages.  The  empirical 
results  have  often  been  impressive  -  as  a  group,  these  studies  explain  consid- 
erably  more  than  100  percent  of  the  change  in  wage  inequality  -  but  the  reader  is 
left  without  a  coherent  story. 
After  evaluating  the  evidence  for  the  technology-induced  skill  mismatch  hypothe- 
sis,  this  paper  attempts  to  fashion  this  non-skill-related  body  of  research  into  a 
“shifting  wage  norms”  explanation  -  one  that  can  be  contrasted  to  the  skill  restruc- 
turing  story.  Briefly,  while  the  upgrading  of  skill  requirements  in  the  1980’s  does  not 
appear  to  have  risen  above  its  long-term  (upward)  trend,  two  major  developments 
differentiated  the  labor  market  of  the  1980’s  from  earlier  decades.  First,  as  a  result 
of  increasing  competitive  pressures  (globalization  and  deregulation)  and  a  shift 
towards  a  much  more  conservative,  pro-market  ideological  climate,  management 
pursued  human  resource  strategies  that  severely  undermined  traditional  wage- 
setting  institutions  (collective  bargaining,  internal  labor  market  norms)  that  had  pro- 
tected  low-skilled  workers  from  the  full  force  of  labor  market  competition.  Second, 
the  closing  of  employment  opportunities  in  the  middle  of  the  earnings  distribution -6- 
(high-wage  blue-collar  jobs  and  moderately  skilled  white-collar  jobs),  the  increasing 
availability  of  contingent  workers,  unprecedented  increases  in  low-skill  foreign 
workers,  and  the  increasing  ability  (due  to  legal  and  technological  changes)  to 
relocate  to  low-wage  locations,  resulted  in  a  massive  increase  in  the  effective 
supply  of  labor  competing  for  low-skill  jobs.  These  developments  led  to  a  collapse 
of  wages  at  the  bottom  of  the  wage  distribution,  facilitated  by  a  25  percent  decline 
in  the  real  value  of  the  legal  minimum  wage  in  the  1980’s.  This  alternative  story  - 
lower  wages  without  substantial  skill  restructuring  -  is  depicted  in  Diagram  2. 
The  first  four  sections  of  this  paper  are  concerned  with  the  evidence  for  the 
technology-induced  skill  mismatch  explanation  for  the  1980’s  wage  collapse. 
Section  1  considers  the  implications  of  recent  wage  and  joblessness  trends  for  skill 
restructuring.  Section  2  surveys  the  evidence  on  the  impacts  of  new  production 
technologies  on  skill  requirements  in  U.S.  workplaces.  It  also  considers  whether 
changes  in  standard  industry  and  occupation  employment  shares  suggests  major 
skill  restructuring  in  the  1980’s.  The  third  section  then  presents  an  alternative  labor 
market  segmentation  perspective  on  employment  restructuring  in  the  1980’s. 
The  evidence  surveyed  in  these  three  sections  indicates  that  while  the  expan- 
sion  of  “problem-solving”  jobs  is  real,  the  upgrading  of  the  skill  distribution  in  the 
1980’s  was  not  radically  different  from  trends  in  previous  decades.  Indeed,  there  is 
some  evidence  that  the  rate  of  increased  slowed  in  this  last  decade.  The  unique- 
ness  of  the  1980’s  appears  to  have  been  less  an  unusually  strong  shift  in  demand 
away  from  low-skill  jobs,  reducing  job  opportunities  and  lowering  wages,  than  a 
dramatic  growth  in  the  share  of  low-wage  jobs:  the  demand  by  employers  for  low 
cost  labor  escalated  dramatically  at  all  skill  levels.  The  main  restructuring  among 
nonsupervisory  male  workers  in  the  1980’s  was,  therefore,  not  towards  higher  skill 
jobs  but  away  from  higher  wage  jobs.  Indeed,  the  share  of  low-skill  jobs  was 
remarkably  stable  from  1983  into  the  1990’s. 
Section  4  surveys  the  evidence  in  support  of  a  shifting  wage  norms  explana- 
tion  for  the  wage  collapse.  Facing  increasingly  competitive  product  markets,  abun- 
dant  supplies  of  workers  willing  to  accept  low  and  declining  real  wages,  favorable -?- 
government  policies  and  a  comfortable  ideological  climate,  employers  took  a  “low- 
road”  human  resource  strategy,  one  aimed  above  all  at  reducing  current  labor 
costs.  Indeed,  in  direct  contrast  to  the  technology-induced  skill  mismatch  story,  the 
fundamental  problem  in  the  1980’s  in  this  alternative  account  was  that  most 
employers  did  @  follow  a  high-tech,  high-skills  path. 
Section  5  concludes  the  paper  with  a  discussion  of  the  policy  implications  of 
these  two  explanations.  If  the  earnings  problems  of  low-skilled  workers  is  mainly 
the  result  of  a  shift  in  the  demand  for  skills  that  stems  from  the  increasing  use  of 
computers  in  the  production  process,  public  policy  must  address  the  need  to 
substantially  upgrade  the  cognitive  skills  of  large  portions  of  the  current  and  future 
workforce  -  although  it  is  unlikely  that  the  effects  of  improvements  in  education  and 
training  would  affect  the  wage  distribution  significantly  for  at  least  a  decade.  On  the 
other  hand,  if  the  real  mismatch  in  the  1980’s  was  between  skills  provided  and 
wages  paid,  improvements  in  education  and  training  programs  are  unlikely  to  have 
much  effect  on  the  earnings  problems  of  most  nonsupervisory  workers  even  in  the 
long  run,  and  public  policies  should  aim  to  help  reverse  the  downward  shifts  in 
wage  norms  without  undermining  the  competitiveness  of  U.S.  firms. 
1.  Relative  Wage  and  Joblessness  Trends  as  Evidence  of  Skill  Mismatch 
The  simple  labor  market  model  assumes  a  close,  if  not  perfect,  correspondence 
between  the  skill  and  wage  distributions:  workers  are  paid  their  marginal  product 
and  the  skills  supplied  by  workers  determine  their  relative  productivity.  This 
assumption  is  made  explicit  in  many  empirical  studies.  Describing  his  methodology 
for  examining  the  incidence  of  unemployment  across  skill  groups,  Topel  (1993:llO) 
writes  that  “I  will  define  relative  marketable  ‘skills’  in  terms  of  a  person’s  position  in 
the  overall  distribution  of  wages.”  Similarly,  Berman,  Bound  and  Griliches  (19935) 
assert  that  “Changes  in  the  wage  bill  share  will  reflect  changes  in  relative  skill 
levels.”  Indeed,  throughout  the  earnings  literature,  skills  are  used  synonymously 
with  wages.  Interpreting  a  figure  showing  real  wage  changes  by  wage  percentile, 
Juhn,  Murphy  and  Pierce  (1993:417)  write  that  “the  divergence  in  wages  across percentiles  is  pervasive  and  is  not  limited  to  a  specific  part  of  the  wage  distribution. 
Skill  differentials  have  increased  at  all  points  in  the  skill  distribution.” 
Within  a  framework  in  which  the  wage  and  skill  distributions  are  interchangeable 
and  with  no  shifts  in  supply,  declining  relative  wages  necessarily  reflect  declining 
“marketable  skills.”  Indeed,  if  standard  measures  of  skills  cannot  account  for  wage 
differentials  or  their  change  over  time,  it  has  become  standard  to  refer  to  the 
residual  as  a  measure  of  “unobserved  skills.”  While  measurement  error  is  usually 
present,  the  danger  of  this  approach  is  that,  by  definition,  it  rules  out  alternative, 
non-price  theoretic  explanations.  As  Diagram  1  showed,  this  model  predicts  falling 
wage  levels  fall  as  well  as  falling  low-skill  (low-wage)  employment  (“job  opportuni- 
ties”).  The  remainder  of  this  section  considers  several  questions  that  bear  directly 
on  the  adequacy  of  this  explanation  for  the  1980’s  wage  collapse. 
Can  we  rely  on  the  simple  marginal  productivity  model  to  understand  relative 
wage  trends  in  the  1980’s?  It  hardly  seems  controversial  to  suggest  that  relative 
wages  are  determined  by  a  variety  of  non-skill  related  factors  (“wage  setting  institu- 
tions”).  While  more  education  tends  to  be  associated  with  higher  earnings,  many 
other  factors  are  equally  or  even  more  important  for  wage  determination,  including 
gender,  race,  union  coverage,  firm  size  and  industry  of  employment  (Groshen, 
1991).  One  only  has  to  ask,  for  example,  why  most  nonsupervisory  jobs  dominated 
by  women  pay  substantially  less  than  those  dominated  by  men  despite  far  higher 
average  educational  attainment  required  in  the  “female  jobs.”  And  if,  for  instance, 
these  “female  jobs”  happen  to  be  increasingly  located  in  small  firms  in  competitive 
industries,  they  will  tend  to  pay  even  less  over  time,  even  if  their  relative  skill  levels 
have  risen.  In  addition,  wage-setting  may  be  affected  by  less  measurable  factors 
like  employer  and  employee  militance,  changes  in  collective  bargaining  laws,  and 
changes  in  the  enforcement  of  government  regulations  affecting  earnings  and 
conditions  of  work  (Mitchell,  1985,  1989;  Wachter  and  Carter,  1989). 
Recent  evidence  on  interindustry  skill  distributions  indicates  that  after  controlling 
for  all  the  standard  characteristics,  workers  in  detailed  occupations  are  paid 
substantially  different  wages  in  different  industries  (Katz  and  Summers,  1989). Using  data  from  the  Dictionary  of  Occupational  Titles,  Howell  and  Wolff  (1991a) 
found  that  the  wage  distribution  was  not  a  good  proxy  for  the  skill  distribution  at  the 
-9- 
occupation  or  industry  level,  whether  skills  are  measured  by  cognitive  skills,  motor 
skills  or  interactive  (“people”)  skills.  The  link  was  particularly  weak  for  nonsup- 
ervisory  occupations. 
Additional  evidence  on  the  skills-wage  link  can  be  found  in  the  earnings 
inequality  literature.  Attempts  to  account  for  the  unprecedented  increase  in  male 
earnings  inequality  throughout  the  1980’s  have  naturally  turned  to  measures  of 
skill.  If  the  wage  distribution  mirrors  the  skill  distribution,  growing  earnings  inequal- 
ity  within  industries  should  be  associated  with  widening  skill  differentials.  But  the 
data  show  little  support  for  this  expectation.  Confirming  earlier  research  by  Karoly 
(1992)  Wieler  (1993)  found  that  changes  in  the  variance  of  educational  attainment 
and  potential  work  experience  on  the  job  do  a  poor  job  of  accounting  for  the  steady 
increase  in  earnings  inequality  within  industries  observed  in  the  1980’s.  Wieler 
went  one  step  further  and  examined  the  effect  of  changes  in  the  variance  of  cogni- 
tive,  interactive  and  motor  skill  measures  from  the  Dictionary  of  Occupational  Titles 
on  earnings  inequality.  Changes  in  these  “direct”  measures  of  skills  reflect  changes 
in  the  detailed  occupation  mix  of  industry  employment.  Examining  33  industries 
between  1973  and  1990,  she  found  no  statistical  effect  at  the  industry  level  in 
either  decade:  Unlike  the  substantial  widening  of  the  wage  distribution  in  the 
1980’s,  the  dispersion  of  skill  requirements  was  unchanged  in  the  1980’s,  even 
among  technologically  advanced  manufacturing  industries  (see  below). 
If  fewer  and  fewer  jobs  require  low  skills  and  this  decline  became  more  rapid  in 
the  1980’s,  and  the  wage  distribution  reflects  the  skill  distribution,  there  should  be 
fewer  jobs  paying  low  wages  -  changes  in  the  share  of  low-wage  workers  should 
roughly  correspond  to  changes  in  the  share  of  low-skill  workers.’  To  examine  this 
5  The  presence  of  too  many  low-skilled  workers  should  not  affect  the  wages  for 
higher  skilled  jobs  since  the  low-skilled  are  not,  presumably,  easily  substitutable  for 
higher  skilled  workers. -lO- 
proposition,  I  calculated  the  share  of  workers  earning  low  wages  and  the  share 
with  low  educational  attainment  for  1975  (the  earliest  year  for  which  hourly  earn- 
ings  can  be  calculated  from  the  Current  Population  Survey),  1979,  1984  and  1990.6 
Low  wages  are  defined  as  1.5  times  the  poverty  level  for  an  urban  family  of  three. 
Assuming  1750  hours  of  work  (50  weeks,  35  hours),  this  “low-wage”  threshold  was 
an  hourly  wage  of  $8.09  in  1988.  Low  skills  was  defined  as  educational  attainment 
that  does  not  go  beyond  high  school.  While  this  is  by  no  means  an  adequate 
measure  of  the  skills  required  in  the  workplace  (see  Howell  and  Wolff,  1991a),  it 
does  offer  a  convenient  and  familiar  measure  of  cognitive  skills.  Since  the  purpose 
was  to  provide  insight  into  current  labor  market  conditions  and  to  reduce  the  effect 
that  older,  less-educated  workers  might  have  on  the  results,  only  those  in  the  first 
half  of  their  careers  (ages  16-39)  were  included  in  the  analysis. 
Figure  1  shows  that  employed  workers  with  low  educational  attainment 
declined  throughout  the  15  year  period,  from  62.8%  in  1975  to  55.5%  in  1990. 
Although  the  technological  change  explanation  would  suggest  that  the  greatest  rate 
of  decline  should  have  taken  place  in  the  second  half  of  the  1980’s  when  the 
demand  for  skills  presumably  accelerated  and  those  without  adequate  skills 
dropped  out  of  the  labor  market,  the  data  indicate  that  the  most  rapid  decline 
actually  took  place  in  the  early  1980’s.  This  Figure  also  shows  that  low  wage 
workers  increased  from  50.6%  to  55.8%  of  the  workforce  from  1975  to  1990,  with 
the  largest  jump  again  occurring  in  the  early  1980’s. 
Figure  2  reports  another  notable  effect  of  1980’s  restructuring:  the  growth  of 
that  part  of  the  workforce  with  relatively  high  educational  attainment  but  earning 
very  low  wages.  Workers  paid  less  than  1.5  times  the  poverty-level  wage  with 
more  than  a  high  school  education  grew  from  6.8  to  12  million  workers  between 
1975  and  1990.  This  amounted  to  an  increase  in  the  low-wage/high-skill  share  of 
employment  from  14.1  to  18.5  percent.  Again,  the  increase  took  place  throughout 
‘Two  of  these  years,  1975  and  1990,  are  recession  years.  Replacing  these  with 
1976  and  1989  has  no  effect  on  the  trends  presented  below. Figure  1:  Low  Wage  and  Low  Skill  Shares 
of  Total  Employment,  1975-90 
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the period, but most (three-quarters) of the change was accounted for by the 1979-
84 period.
Figures 3 and 4 distinguish the skill and wage trends shown in Figure 1
separately for the goods and service industries. These report that a declining share
of low-skill workers and a rising share of low-wage workers characterize both
industry groups. But there are two interesting differences. First, the pace of the
restructuring  -  the percentage change from  197590   -  was much more rapid in the
goods than the service sector, both with respect to skills and earnings. Second,
compared to the service industries, employment in the goods industries is charac-
terized by far lower shares of low-wage workers in each of the four years  (3744%
vs.  59-62%)  and much higher shares of low-skill workers (7364% vs. 5651%).
At the industry level, the growth in low wage employment was the most pro-
nounced in the goods industries. Of the 10 industries with greater than 20%
increases from 1975 to 1990 in the low-wage share of total employment, 9 were
goods producing. Among industries with substantial declines in the low-skill share
of employment, many had large increases in low-wage shares. For example,
between 1975 and 1990 restructuring in the Stone, Clay, Glass and Primary Metals
industry (which includes steel) resulted in a 9% decline in the share of low-skill
employment (from 77% to 70%) but a 76% increase in the low-wage share (from
23% to 40%). The communications industry saw its low-skill share decline by 33%
(from 58% to 39%) and its low-wage share increase by 33% (from 22 to 29%).
Even more dramatically, the automobile industry’s low-skill employment share
declined by 6% (from 76% to 71%) but its low wage share grew by 142% (from
17% to  40%).7  Goods industries with high-wage, low-skill workforces appear to
have restructured in the 1980’s by radically lowering wages and gradually raising
skill requirements  -  in short, by moving in the direction of the typical service sector
7These  results are conservative since temporary workers, whose share of employ-
ment greatly expanded in the  1980’s,  are defined as service sector workers and are
not included in the data.-12 - 
workplace. 
The  elimination  of  living-wage,  low-cognitive  skill  jobs  (see  Section  3)  has  pro- 
duced  an  extraordinarily  rapid  convergence  of  low-wage  and  low-skill  employment 
shares  among  industries  since  1979.  Interestingly,  in  this  respect  the  recent 
restructuring  has  made  the  labor  market  more  like  that  described  in  the  textbook 
model.  The  correlation  between  low-wage  and  low-skill  shares  of  employment  was 
insignificant  in  1979  (.057)  but  rose  to  .255  in  1984  and  .337  in  1990.  As  will  be 
seen  in  the  next  section,  a  key  avenue  through  which  this  convergence  was 
achieved  was  by  reducing  the  share  of  low-skill  workers  with  relatively  high 
earnings. 
The  skill  mismatch  model  also  predicts  an  increase  in  joblessness  as  the 
demand  for  low-skill  workers  declines.  As  new  computer-based  production  technol- 
ogies  have  became  more  widespread  and  more  effectively  utilized  over  time, 
joblessness  among  the  least  skilled  should  have  steadily  grown  over  the  1980’s. 
Indeed,  high  unemployment  and  nonparticipation  rates  have  been  frequently  cited 
as  evidence  of  a  declining  demand  for  low-skill  workers  (see  Juhn,  1992;  Topel, 
1993).  Just  as  the  standard  labor  market  model  implies  that  skill  restructuring  is  the 
source  of  wage  restructuring,  the  model  suggests  that  if  rising  joblessness  occurs 
as  wages  (skills)  decline,  it  is  declining  demand  for  low-skill  labor  (declining  job 
opportunities)  that  accounts  for  rising  joblessness.  But  if  we  “unbundle”  the  skill 
and  wage  distributions,  increasing  joblessness  might  be  seen  as  the  result  of 
falling  wage  levels  (which  may  reflect  management  practices,  government  policies, 
or  supply  side  developments)  with  no  necessary  role  for  changes  in  job  opportuni- 
ties. 
It  should  be  noted  that  low-skilled  male  workers  have  always  shown  greater 
unemployment  and  nonparticipation  rates  than  higher  skilled  workers,  for  an 
obvious  reason:  the  jobs  available  to  lower  skill  workers  are  not  as  good  and  there 
is  less  incentive  to  maintain  a  stable  employment  record.  The  worsening  of  these 
rates  may  occur  independently  of  the  effects  of  skill  restructuring  on  job  opportuni- 
ties  for  low-skill  workers  -  either  through  increases  in  competition  from  new  sources -13- 
of  labor  supply  (increases  in  female  participation,  demographic  shifts  that  increase 
the  numbers  of  young  workers  in  the  labor  market,  displacement  of  higher  wage 
workers,  or  rising  numbers  of  low-skilled  foreign  workers)  or  as  a  result  of  a  decline 
in  job  quality  (e.g.,  falling  earnings  and  benefits  or  rising  job  insecurity),  or  both. 
Thus,  an  alternative  explanation  for  rising  joblessness  in  the  1980’s  is  that  the 
quality  of  jobs  fell  sharply  due  to  employer  wage  and  employment  policies  (see 
Mitchell,  1985  and  1989;  Wachter  and  Carter,  1989)  and  the  crowding  of  workers 
into  the  secondary  labor  market  (Borjas,  1993)  intensified,  generating  higher  turn- 
over  (as  workers  search  for  better  jobs)  and  rising  numbers  of  discouraged  work- 
ers. 
A  recent  paper  by  Topel  (1993)  provides  a  good  example  of  the  importance  of 
the  lense  through  which  the  data  are  examined.  Topel  (1993)  argues  that  since  the 
secular  rise  in  jobless  time  has  occurred  only  among  those  earning  the  lowest 
wages,  the  most  likely  explanation  is  a  decline  in  demand  for  low-skilled  workers. 
But  his  data  show  a  clear  secular  trend  only  through  the  recession  years  of  1980- 
82.  While  nonparticipation  rates  rose  from  1983  through  1989  for  low-wage  men, 
unemployment  rates  fell  even  faster;  the  offsetting  nature  of  these  series  suggests 
little  change  in  overall  joblessness  after  1983.  These  divergent  trends  are  also 
consistent  with  a  very  different  story  for  the  1980’s:  there  were  increasing  opportu- 
nities  for  jobs  that  were  declining  in  quality  and  as  a  result,  for  those  who  chose  to 
remain  in  the  labor  market,  unemployment  rates  fell.  But  declining  job  quality  also 
led  to  greater  discouragment,  leading  to  higher  nonparticipation  rates. 
Does  other  evidence  support  increasing  joblessness  in  the  1980’s?  Juhn’s 
(1992:Figure  3)  data  show  that  participation  rates  for  both  white  and  black  male 
high  school  dropouts  and  high  school  graduates  e  steadily  from  1982  through 
1987.  For  young  (20-24)  black  males  -  a  demographic  group  as  likely  as  any  to  be 
negatively  affected  by  a  declining  demand  for  low  skill  workers  -  the  employed 
share  of  the  population  fell  sharply  from  72.6%  in  1973  to  65.5%  in  1979  and  again 
to  53.9%  in  1982,  but  has  risen  steadily  since,  reaching  63.9%  in  1988  (U.S. 
Department  of  Labor,  1989,  Table  16).  Thus,  the  employment  rate  for  this  group  at -  14 - 
the  end  of  the  1980’s  was  about  what  it  was  in  1979.  The  data  for  other  male 
groups  show  similar  trends.  One  might  ask  at  this  point  why,  if  the  problem  is  skill 
mismatch  due  to  the  increasing  skill  requirements  of  new  workplace  technologies, 
did  most  of  the  increase  in  joblessness  take  place  in  the  1970’s  and  not  in  the  mid 
and  late  1980’s? 
2.  New  Production  Technologies  and  Skill  Restructuring 
A  strong  case  for  skill  mismatch  as  the  explanation  for  the  earnings  problems 
of  low  skilled  workers  in  the  1980’s  requires  more  than  evidence  of  declining 
relative  wages  and  low  employment  rates.  Undoubtedly,  the  attractiveness  of  the 
story  is  its  consistency  with  both  the  observed  declines  in  the  relative  wages  of  low 
skilled  workers  in  the  1980’s  and  the  popular  vision  of  the  effects  of  computer- 
based  mechanization  in  the  workplace.  With  the  rapid  diffusion  of  computer-based 
production  technologies  and  an  increasingly  competitive  environment,  it  is  widely 
recognized  that  the  old  regime  of  large,  integrated,  capital-intensive  plants  relying 
on  low-skill  manual  labor  is  being  transformed  into  a  new  production  system  of 
small,  flexible,  technologically  advanced  firms  that  depend  upon  an  elite  cadre  of 
highly  educated  workers.  Unlike  the  traditional  “Taylorist”  model,  in  the  new  “high 
performance”  workplace  workers  must  possess  the  cognitive  and  diagnostic  skills 
necessary  to  perform  a  broad  range  of  frequently  changing  tasks.  So  the  upshot  is 
that  computers  and  related  technologies  require  higher  skills  and  workers  with 
obsolete  or  insufficient  skills  inevitably  get  paid  less  and  ultimately  lose  their  jobs, 
leaving  behind  a  more  skilled  workforce.  This  transformation  is  undoubtedly 
underway.  But  does  it  explain  the  wage  collapse? 
Most  studies  of  skill  change  using  aggregate  data  have  employed  indirect  mea- 
sures  of  technological  change  (productivity  growth  or  the  residual  from  wage  equa- 
tions)  and  skills  (educational  attainment,  potential  experience  or  relative  wages).  In 
an  attempt  to  study  the  determinants  of  the  levels  and  change  in  skill  requirements 
using  dire&  measures,  Howell  and  Wolff  (1992)  measured  the  use  of  new  technol- 
ogy  by  the  value  of  computer  purchases  per  dollar  of  output,  the  share  of  new -15- 
investment  in  total  capital  stock,  and  the  share  of  engineers  in  the  total  workforce. 
Skills  were  measured  by  indices  of  cognitive,  interactive  and  motor  skill  job  require- 
ments  derived  from  the  Dictionary  of  Occupational  Titles  as  well  as  by  the  shares 
of  five  large  occupation  groups  in  total  employment.  Their  results  indicated  that 
new  production  technologies  have  indeed  tended  to  increase  the  cognitive  skill 
levels  of  the  workforce  since  1970,  with  the  strongest  and  most  reliable  effects 
occurring  in  the  goods  industries.  The  use  of  occupation  shares  as  measures  of 
skill  levels  produced  mixed  results:  the  deployment  of  new  technology  clearly 
raised  the  demand  for  professional  and  technical  workers  (high  cognitive  skill) 
while  reducing  the  demand  for  managers  (moderate-high  skill),  clerical  workers 
(low-moderate  skill),  and  operatives  and  laborers  (low  skill).  These  results  suggest 
that  while  the  effects  of  new  production  technology  on  skills  varies  by  sector  and 
occupation  group,  it  is  fair  to  say  that,  overall,  it  tends  to  raise  the  demand  for  high 
cognitive  skill  workers  and  reduce  the  demand  for  low  cognitive  skill  workers. 
There  is  also  some  evidence  that  both  educational  attainment  and  the  return  to 
education  are  higher  in  industries  that  are  more  technology-intensive,  usually  mea- 
sured  by  R&D  spending  (or  employment)  and  total  factor  productivity  growth  (Bartel 
Lichtenberg,  1987;  Mincer,  1989,  Allen,  1993).  But  to  explain  the  earnings  collapse 
for  low-skill  workers,  there  should  have  been  a  speed-up  in  the  effective  use  of 
new  technology  in  all  sectors  in  the  1980’s.  Does  recent  research  indicate  that  the 
impact  of  technological  change  on  the  mix  of  skills  required  in  the  workplace  was 
substantially  greater  in  the  1980’s  than  in  earlier  decades?  Was  the  impact  of  this 
skill  restructuring  on  earnings  sufficient  to  account  for  a  large  portion  of  the  col- 
lapse  of  low-wage  male  earnings  throughout  the  economy? 
Few  studies  have  directly  addressed  these  questions.  Allen  (1993)  does, 
however,  present  evidence  that  the  rate  of  technological  change,  as  measured  by 
the  share  of  R&D  scientists  and  engineers  in  total  employment,  was  greater  in  the 
1980’s  than  in  the  1970’s  and  concludes  that  some  of  the  wage  restructuring 
during  this  decade  can  be  attributed  to  this  increase.  His  measure  of  technological 
change  accounts  for  48  percent  of  the  increase  in  returns  to  schooling  in  the -  16  - 
1980’s  for  workers  in  manufacturing,  but  only  7  percent  for  the  entire  workforce. 
These  results  imply  that  trends  in  manufacturing  cannot  be  generalized  to  the 
entire  economy.  Even  within  the  manufacturing  sector,  Allen  points  out  that  his 
results  do  not  suggest  that  technological  change  alone  can  explain  much  of  the 
sharp  absolute  declines  in  the  real  earnings  of  low-skill  male  workers  in  the  1980’s. 
He  shows  that  the  main  effect  of  technological  change,  as  measured  by  his  proxy 
for  R&D  activity,  is  on  the  earnings  growth  of  the  most  hiqhlv  skilled  workers.  As 
he  puts  it,  “Rising  R&D  activity  is  associated  with  higher  wages  for  college  gradu- 
ates,  but  is  completely  unrelated  to  wages  of  other  educational  groups.  This 
implies  that  the  correlation  between  R&D  and  returns  to  schooling...reflects  greater 
wage  growth  for  college  graduates  in  R&D-intensive  industries,  rather  than  a 
negative  demand  shock  for  high  school  graduates  employed  in those  industries” 
(1993:22). 
In  a  study  of  changing  employment  shares  in  manufacturing,  Berman,  Bound 
and  Griliches  (1993:2)  point  out  that  there  was  a  large  increase  in  the  nonproduc- 
tion  share  of  manufacturing  employment  in  the  1980’s:  “Between  1979  and  1989 
the  employment  of  production  workers  in  U.S.  manufacturing  dropped  by  a 
dramatic  15  percent  from  14.5  to  12.3  million,  while  non-production  employment 
rose  3  percent  from  6.5  to  6.7  million.”  The  authors  interpret  these  trends  as 
evidence  that  the  manufacturing  sector  experienced  substantial  skill  upgrading  over 
this  decade  and  that  “biased  technological  change  is  an  important  part  of  the 
explanation”  (1993:33). 
Since  the  diffusion  and  effective  use  of  computer-based  technologies  is  almost 
certainly  taking  place  at  an  increasing  rate,  a  technological  change  explanation  for 
skill  restructuring  implies  that  the  decline  in  demand  for  low-skill  jobs  should  have 
become  progressively  greater  throughout  the  decade.  Indeed,  Berman,  Bound  and 
Griliches  (1993:Table  13)  report  a  rapid  increase  in  the  rate  of  growth  of  computer 
investments  as  a  share  of  total  investment  in  manufacturing:  from  2.79  percent  in 
1977  to  3.92  percent  in  1982  and  7.49  percent  in  1987.  Table  2  shows  the  invest- 
ment  in  Office,  Computing  and  Accounting  (OCA)  Machinery  in  four  (arbitrarily -  17  - 
chosen)  “high-tech”  industries  from  1977-1986  in  constant  dollars.  After  the  mid- 
1970’s,  almost  all  OCA  machinery  investment  consisted  of  computers.  These  data 
confirm  that  the  investment  in  computers  took  place  at  a  rapidly  increasing  rate 
over  this  period.  The  last  row  shows  that  in  1982  dollars,  the  real  investment  in 
computers  in  1985-86  ranged  from  2.7  to  6.7  times  greater  than  the  investment  in 
1977-78. 
Table  2 
Investment  in  Office,  Accounting  and  Computing  Machinery 
For  Selected  Industries,  1977-86 







268  3,695  1,955  314 
309  4,339  2,383  467 
365  4,521  2,592  559 
2,047  26,399  11,495  2,787 
2.75  3.53  6.66  3.23 
It  is  immediately  apparent  from  the  employment  trends  presented  by  Berman, 
Bound  and  Griliches  that  virtually  all  of  the  “skill  upgrading”  they  observe  took -  18  - 
place  in  just  3  years  -  1980,  1981  and  1982.’  Indeed,  their  data  indicate  that  the 
nonproduction  share  of  employment  in  1983  was  identical  to  the  share  six  years 
later.  Figure  5  plots  the  nonproduction  employment  shares  for  durable,  nondurable 
and  total  manufacturing  for  1970-92.  The  graph  shows  that  the  change  in  this  mea- 
sure  of  the  skill  mix  in  manufacturing  can  be  traced  largely  to  developments  in  the 
durable  manufacturing  sector  between  1980-82.  The  share  of  nonproduction 
workers  in  this  sector  increased  sharply,  from  28.6  percent  in  1979  to  33.8  percent 
in  1982,  and  then  fluctuated  between  33.2  and  34.1  percent  over  the  next  10 
years.  Although  Berman,  Bound  and  Griliches  note  that  employers  use  recessions 
to  restructure,  there  is  no  evidence  that  there  was  a  substantial  shift  in  skill  mix  in 
the  1990-91  downturn.  The  question  for  the  technology-induced  skill  mismatch 
hypothesis  is:  Why  would  the  use  of  new  workplace  technologies  cause  a  sharp 
skill  restructuring  between  1980  and  1982  but  not  between  1983  and  1992,  when 
the  latter  period,  as  Table  2  shows,  was  characterized  by  a  far  higher  rate  of 
investment  in  computer-based  equipment? 
Table  3  provides  additional  evidence  on  the  stability  of  the  skill  mix  in  manufac- 
turing  after  the  recessions  of  1980-82.  Between  1983  and  1988,  the  ratios  of  craft 
to  semi-skilled  workers,  technicians  to  clerical  workers,  and  professionals  to 
managers  remained  virtually  unchanged.  But  as  the  first  column  shows,  the  ratio  of 
craft  workers  to  laborers  declined  steadily  from  about  4  in  1983  to  to  3.4  in  1987  (it 
then  rose  slightly  to  3.5  in  1988).  These  figures  do  not  suggest  a  technological 
transformation  of  production,  nor  the  kind  of  skill  restructuring  that  could  explain 
the  enormous  earnings  declines  suffered  by  low-skill  workers  or  the  considerable 
widening  of  the  earnings  gap  between  low-  and  high-skilled  workers  observed  in 
the  last  decade. 
‘Although  they  don’t  seem  to  think  that  the  timing  of  the  restructuring  matters  for 
their  story,  the  authors  do  recognize  that  the  employment  shifts  were  concentrated  in 
the  1980-82  period:  “roughly  70  percent  of  the  within-industry  and  over  80  percent  of 
the  between-industry  shifts  .  .  .  that  occurred  between  1979  and  1987  did  so  between 
1979  and  1982”  (Berman,  Bound  and  Griliches,  1993:lO). Figure  5:  The  Nonproduction  Share  of 
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Table  3: 
Occupational  Employment  Shares  In  Manufacturing,  1983-88 
1987  3.38  .60  .28 
1988  3.54  .60  .29 
Source:  Handbook  of Labor  Statistics,  Table  20,  (U.S.  Department  of Labor,  1989). 
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The  timing  of  these  employment  and  investment  trends  is  also  relevant  to  the 
interpretation  of  the  regression  results  presented  in  the  Berman,  Bound  and 
Griliches  study.  They  regress  the  1979-87  change  in  the  nonproduction  share  of 
employment  across  industries  on  the  level  and  change  in  the  share  of  computers  in 
total  investment.  The  coefficients  are  positive,  and  they  conclude  that  this  measure 
of  technological  change  accounts  for  “one-quarter  to  one-half  of  the  within-industry 
move  away  from  production  labor  that  occurred  over  the  1980’s”  (p.  27).  Even  if 
these  one  and  two  variable  regressions  are  adequately  specified,’  and  the  direction 
of  causation  is  right  (the  authors  point  out  that  it  may  be  that  industries  with  high 
nonproduction  shares  tend  to  invest  more  in  computers  -  more  office  workers 
require  more  desktops),  is  it  plausible  that  investments  in  computers,  which  took 
place  mainly  after  1982,  can  explain  up  to  half  of  the  shift  away  from  production 
labor,  which  occurred  entirely  before  1983?  Interestingly,  they  note  that  their  1977- 
‘There  are  surely  other  factors  than  computers  that  account  for  changes  in  the 
nonproduction  share.  Gordon  (1993)  interprets  the  same  measure  as  an  indicator,  not 
of  skill  mix,  but  of  “bureaucratic  burden”  reflecting  the  need  of  employers  in  a  confron- 
tational  labor  relations  setting  to  intensively  supervise  and  monitor  workers.  He  has 
shown  that  this  share  varies  dramatically  across  highly  developed  nations  -  all 
presumably  with  roughly  similar  investments  in  computer-based  technologies. -  20  - 
87  computer  variables  as  well  as  their  1974  measure  of  R&D  are  also  powerful 
predictors  of  nonproduction  employment  trends  for  1959-73,  a  period  with  virtually 
no  computer  investment. 
It  seems  quite  reasonable  to  agree  that  “skill  upgrading  has  been  occurring  in 
‘high-tech’  manufacturing  industries”  (Berman,  Bound  and  Griliches,  1993:30),  but 
the  important  -  and  controversial  -  questions  are  whether  shifts  in  skill  compostion 
were  substantially  greater  in  the  1980’s  than  in  earlier  decades,  whether  these 
shifts  were  due  entirely  or  largely  to  the  use  of  computer-based  technologies,  and 
whether  any  shift  in  the  demand  for  skills  that  did  occur  can  explain  a large  portion 
of  the  wage  collapse  for  low-skill  men  in  the  1980’s.  A  compelling  technological 
change  explanation  for  the  expansion  of  male  earnings  inequality  and  the  growing 
share  of  male  workers  with  low  earnings  throughout  this  decade  needs  to  account 
for  the  failure  of  the  skill  mix  to  not  only  upgrade  after  1983,  but  upgrade  at  an  in- 
creasing  rate.” 
Another  perspective  on  skill  and  wage  restructuring  is  provided  by  trends  in 
skill  and  wage  inequality.  If  skill  restructuring  is  the  source  of  declining  wages, 
trends  in  skill  inequality  should  map  closely  to  movements  in  wage  inequality.  Does 
the  evidence  support  this?  As  mentioned  above,  Wieler  (1993)  developed  mea- 
sures  of  cognitive,  interactive,  and  motor  skills  from  the  Dictionary  of  Occupational 
Titles  and  added  these  to  Karoly’s  (1992)  model.  These  measures  reflect  direct 
ratings  of  skill  requirements  of  detailed  occupations  by  U.S.  Department  of  Labor 
specialists;  changes  in  the  skill  measures  reflect  changes  in  employment  mix 
among  some  500-odd  occupations. 
lo  It  is  worth  noting  that  Borjas  and  Ramey  (1993)  reject  the  technological  change 
story  on  timing  grounds:  “There  is  no  commonly  agreed  upon  measure  of  skill-biased 
technological  change.  In  fact,  much  of  the  work  that  argues  for  skill-biased 
tecnological  change  as  an  important  factor  in  relative  wages  uses  residuals  from 
regressions...  The  residuals  graphed  above,  however,  do  not  look  like  technological 
change,  because  they  have  no  correlation  over  time.  Therefore  our  results  lead  us  to 
doubt  the  importance  of  technological  change  (aside  from  its  effects  on  the  trade 
flows)  on  relative  wages”  (Borjas  and  Ramey,  1993:9,12). -21  - 
Wieler  found  that  changes  in  the  variance  of  these  “direct”  measures  of  skill 
had  no  reliable  statistical  effect  on  changes  in  earnings  inequality.  Particularly 
striking  were  the  results  at  the  industry  level.  She  presents  figures  that  report  the 
variance  of  hourly  earnings,  educational  attainment,  and  three  measures  of  skill 
requirements  from  the  Dictionary  of  Occupational  Titles  for  each  year  from  1975 
through  1990  for  each  of  33  industries.  While  earnings  inequality  increased  in 
almost  every  industry,  the  skill  measures  showed  little  change.  For  example,  the 
variance  of  hourly  earnings  in  the  Auto  industry  increased  from  .I90  to  .298  over 
this  period,  almost  all  of  which  took  place  after  1979.  Yet,  the  skill  measures  all 
show  remarkable  stability  -  the  data  show  no  evidence  of  a  growing  dispersion  of 
skill  levels.  The  same  pattern  can  be  seen  for  other  durable  goods  industries,  such 
as  Electrical  Equipment,  Machinery,  as  well  as  many  service  industries. 
From  the  vantage  point  of  the  entire  economy,  there  is  no  doubt  that  there  has 
been  a  gradual  increase  in  the  demand  for  highly  skilled  workers.  As  Fritz  Machlup 
pointed  out  back  in  the  early  1960’s,  the  increase  in  the  demand  for  information 
workers  -  those  with  relatively  high  cognitive  skills  -  dates  to  at  least  the  turn  of  the 
century.  While  this  was  caused  in  large  part  by  the  shift  away  from  agriculture  in 
the  early  decades  of  the  century,  the  same  trend  can  be  found  in  the  goods 
industries  since  the  1940’s.  Indeed,  the  share  of  semi-skilled  and  low-skilled 
manual  workers  in  total  employment  declined  substantially  in  each  decade  from 
1950  to  1980  (Howell  and  Wolff,  1991  b).  Several  recent  studies  using  economy- 
wide  data  on  occupation  and  industry  employment  trends  and  direct  measures  of 
skill  requirements  have  found  declininq  rates  of  skill  growth  with  each  decade  since 
the  1960’s  (Howell  and  Wolff,  199la;  Mishel  and  Teixera,  1991). 
Using  different  data  and  methods,  Murphy  and  Welch  (AER,  May  1993)  con- 
cluded  that  “we  do  not  find  that  the  demand  for  skill  grew  particularly  rapidly  during 
the  1970’s  and  1980’s,  a  period  when  wage  inequality  expanded  in  comparison  to 
the  three  earlier  decades....”  Similarly,  Katz  (1991:105)  notes  that  “Estimates  of 
within-  and  between-industry  demand  shifts  indicate  little  or  no  acceleration  in  the 
1980’s”  and  suggests  that  “the  differences  in  the  1970’s  and  the  1980’s  depend substantially  on  differences  in  relative  supply  shifts.” 
Interestingly,  the  same  Skill  Commission  whose  theme  was  the  necessity  of 
-  22  - 
choosing  between  high  skills  or  low  wages  conducted  a  survey  of  employers  and 
found  that  only  5  percent  of  the  firms  were  actually  concerned  about  a  skill 
shortage.  This  is  consistent  with  the  key  finding  of  a new  study  on  international 
competitiveness  by  a  prominant  commission,  assembled  by  the  McKinsey  consult- 
ing  firm  and  headed  by  Professor  Robert  Solow  of  MIT,  that  it  was  not  primarily 
skills  or  technology  that  distinguished  productivity  rates  among  nations,  but  rather 
management  and  labor  relations  policies  (cite). 
Any  discussion  of  the  role  played  by  technological  change  in  distinguishing  the 
earnings  trends  of  the  1980’s  from  previous  decades  should  consider  industry  and 
occupation  case  studies.  Curiously,  it  is  rare  in  the  earnings  literature  to  find  such 
references.  Although  it  seems  safe  to  say  that,  as  a  rule,  studies  showing  signifi- 
cant  effects  are  more  likely  to  be  submitted  and  accepted  for  publication  than  those 
that  show  negligible  effects,  a  number  of  recent  case  studies  appear  to  raise 
doubts  about  the  extent  of  skill  upgrading  due  to  technological  change  in  the 
workplace. 
In  his  study  of  machine  shops  in  the  U.S.,  Jeffrey  Keefe  (199151516)  found 
that  “the  diffusion  of  NC  (numerical  controls)  has  had  no  significant  impact  on 
overall  machine  shop  skill  levels.”  Using  data  from  a  large  compensation  consulting 
firm,  Peter  Cappelli  (1993:528)  reports  significant  skill  upgrading  for  most  produc- 
tion  occupations  between  1978  and  1986,  but  consistent  with  Keefe’s  finding,  the 
cause  did  not  appear  to  be  technological  change:  “Changes  in  production  jobs 
seem  much  more  driven  by  developments  in  traditional  employee  relations  arenas. 
Particularly  influential  have  been  new  management  views  concerning  how  jobs 
should  be  redesigned.”  According  to  Milkman  and  Pullman  (1991)  the  technolog- 
ical  upgrading  of  GM’s  Linden  New  Jersey  plant  in  the  mid  1980’s  tended  to  raise 
skill  requirements  of  skilled  jobs  and  deskill  the  semi-  and  lower-skill  jobs.  Similar- 
ly,  among  clerical  jobs,  Cappelli  (p.524)  finds  that  half  “experienced  significant 
upskilling,  and  the  other  half  had  significant  deskilling”  and  concludes  that  new -  23  - 
office  technologies  appear  to  be  the  cause  of  the  deskilling.  Tilly  (1992)  also  refers 
to  the  deskilling  of  cashiers  by  new  electronic  scanning  systems.  It  should  be  noted 
that  deskilling  should  have  the  effect  of  increasing  job  opportunities  for  those  with 
the  least  educational  attainment. 
The  available  evidence  indicates  that  there  is  considerable  flexibility  in  the  way 
U.S.  firms  have  reorganized  production  as  new  computer-based  technologies  were 
introduced  in  the  late  1970’s  and  1980’s,  ranging  from  sharp  skill  upgrading  to  little 
change  or  even  deskilling  (Shaiken,  1985).  In  a  careful  study  of  plants  using 
identical  flexible  manufacturing  systems  producing  similar  products  in  Japan  and 
the  U.S.,  Jaikumar  (1986)  found  startling  differences  in  performance  and  employ- 
ment  patterns.  Japanese  plants  were  more  flexible  and  productive  and  relied 
heavily  on  skilled  workers,  particularly  engineers  (over  40  percent  of  the 
workforce).  U.S.  plants,  on  the  other  hand,  employed  far  greater  shares  of  low- 
skilled  workers  (8  percent  were  engineers). 
But  there  is  also  evidence  that  high  tech  plants  can  be  operated  efficientlv  with 
relatively  low-skilled  workers.  Shaiken  (1993)  describes  a  new,  technologically  ad- 
vanced  Ford  assembly  and  stamping  plant  in  Mexico.  This  plant  had  higher  quality 
ratings  on  the  cars  it  produced  than  five  of  the  eight  Japanese-owned  factories  in 
the  United  States.  According  to  the  skill  mismatch  perspective,  a  high-tech,  high- 
performance  manufacturing  plant  such  as  this  should  rely  primarily  on  highly  skilled 
workers  -  there  should  be  relatively  few  job  opportunities  for  low-skilled  workers. 
But  according  to  Shaiken  (p.  60)  “the  average  age  of  the  initial  workers  hired  was 
in  the  early  twenties.  All  lacked  auto  industry  experience.  Thirty  percent  had  a 
junior  high  school  education  and  63  percent  had  completed  high  school  or  a 
technical  education.”  Evidently,  high-tech,  high-performance  manufacturing  is 
consistent  with  an  extremely  low-skill  and  inexperienced  workforce. 
In  a  recent  case  study  of  changes  in  occupational  employment  in  the  commer- 
cial  banking  industry,  Kuster  (1993:24-25)  concluded  that  despite  substantial 
restructuring  as  a  result  of  deregulation  and  the  introduction  of  computer-based 
technologies,  “commercial  banks  tended  to  retain  their  traditional  occupational -  24  - 
staffing  patterns.”  In  fact,  despite  the  rapidly  growing  use  of  automated  teller 
machines  (ATM’s),  tellers  actually  increased  in  both  number  and  share  of  total 
industry  employment.  Again,  there  is  little  evidence  from  this  industry  that  techno- 
logical  change  dramatically  reduced  job  opportunities  for  low-skill  workers  in  the 
1980’s.  The  effects  of  new  technologies  on  job  opportunities  and  skill  levels 
appears  to  vary  widely  by  company,  industry  and  occupation,  and  the  aggregate 
upgrading  that  took  place  in  this  decade  probably  reflects  a  continuation  of  long- 
run  trends. 
3.  Changes  in  the  Job  Quality  Structure:  An  Alternative  Perspective  on 
Employment  Restructuring 
The  simple  demand  and  supply  framework  shown  in  Diagram  1  predicts  that 
declining  demand  for’low-skill  workers  will  generate  fewer  low-skill/low-wage  jobs. 
The  evidence,  however,  suggests  that  the  skill  and  wage  distributions  are  not 
identical,  and  Figures  1-4  indicate  growing  shares  of  low-wage  workers.  If  there  are 
substantial  numbers  of  low-skill,  moderate-wage  jobs,  as  well  as  many  moderate- 
skill,  low-wage  jobs,  it  might  be  useful  to  have  a  classification  scheme  that  groups 
jobs  by  taking  into  account  both  wage  and  skill  levels.  This,  in  turn,  requires  that 
jobs  are  defined  by  both  industry  and  detailed  occupation  (Costrell,  1990).  That  is 
because,  first,  there  are  vast  differences  in  the  quality  of  jobs  in  each  industry,  no 
matter  how  detailed  its  definition,  and  second,  because  occupation  groups  include 
very  different  kinds  of  jobs  depending  upon  the  industry  of  employment.  Compare, 
for  example,  the  earnings  of  a  legal  secretary  with  a  secretary  employed  in,  say,  a 
private  university.  Or  compare  the  pay  of  a  truck  driver  for  a  local  furniture  store 
with  a  driver  for  the  U.S.  Postal  Service. 
One  could,  therefore,  define  jobs  by  both  occupation  and  industry,  and  then 
group  these  occupation-industry  cells  into  a  small  number  of  categories  based  on  a 
number  of  accepted  indicators  of  job  quality.  This  would  offer  the  advantages  of 
both  simplicity  (a  small  number  of  job  groups)  and  usefulness  (job  groups  that  are 
relatively  similar  in  terms  of  quality).  Using  cluster  analysis,  Maury  Gittleman  and  I - 25 - 
have  done  this  (Gittleman  and  Howell,  1993).  We  grouped  621  jobs  (94%  of  the 
nonagricultural  workforce)  on  the  basis  of  17  measures  of  job  quality”  and  found 
that  the  structure  of  jobs  could  be  characterized  in  three  tiers,  or  “segments,”  each 
with  two  component  “contours.”  Each  of  these  job  contours  employed  between  11 
and  21  percent  of  total  employment  in  1979. 
The  Independent  Primary  segment  consists  of  two  subsets  of  jobs  distin- 
guished  primarily  by  whether  the  employer  is  the  public  sector.  The  Pn’vate 
independent  Primary  (I-P) contour  is  characterized  by  high  earnings,  high  shares  of 
workers  with  health  and  pension  benefits,  high  cognitive  skill  levels,  and  full-time 
private  sector  jobs.  These  are  almost  exclusively  professional,  managerial,  and 
high-wage  sales  jobs,  Jobs  in  the  Public I-P contour  were  similar  in  most  respects, 
but  workers  in  these  jobs  were  employed  almost  exclusively  in  the  public  sector. 
Examples  are  teachers,  police,  firefighters,  postal  workers,  and  public  sector 
managers  and  administrators. 
The  Subordinate  Primary  segment  also  consists  of  two  contours,  the  Routine 
White-Collar  and  the  High-Wage  Blue-Collar.  The  white-collar  job  group  pays 
moderate  wages,  requires  moderate  cognitive  skill  levels  but  demands  very  low 
strength  and  other  physical  demands.  Most  of  the  workforce  is  female.  Examples 
of  these  jobs  are  nurses,  health  technicians,  and  full-time  clerical  workers.  The 
High-Wage  Blue-Collar  contour  is  made  up  moderate/high  wage,  low  cognitive  skill 
jobs  in  which  high  shares  of  workers  have  health  and  pension  benefits,  are  union- 
ized,  and  do  tasks  requiring  substantial  strength  and  other  physical  demands  (e.g., 
truck  drivers,  assemblers,  and  machine  operatives  in  high-wage  industries). 
The  Secondary  segment  includes  the  Low-Wage  Blue-Collar  and  Contingent 
contours.  Compared  to  the  High-Wage  Blue  Collar  contour,  workers  in  Low-Wage 
Blue-Collar jobs  earn  much  less,  are  less  likely  to  be  union  members  or  to  have 
employer  paid  health  and  pension  benefits,  require  lower  cognitive  skills,  and  work 
“Demographic  characteristics  like  gender,  race,  age,  and  marital  status  were  not 
employed  in  the  cluster  analysis. -  26  - 
at  tasks  requiring  higher  strength  and  other  physical  demands.  Typical  of  these 
jobs  are  machine  operatives  and  laborers  in  various  low-wage  industries,  carpen- 
ters  and  painters  in  construction,  and  cooks  and  miscellaneous  food  occupations  in 
retail  trade.  The  Contingent  contour  consists  of  jobs  that  pay  poverty-level  wages, 
are  the  least  likely  to  provide  health  and  pension  benefits,  and  have  the  highest 
shares  of  workers  employed  part-time  and  part-year.  At  the  same  time,  average 
educational  levels  are  substantially  higher  than  in  the  two  blue-collar  contours. 
Examples  are  cashiers  and  sales  occupations  in  retail  trade,  child  care  workers 
and  household  workers. 
These  six  contours  were  defined  using  data  for  1979  (primarily  from  the  1980 
Census).  Earnings  ranged  from  $17,400  in  the  Private  I-P contour,  where  86 
percent  worked  full-time,  to  $4,700  in  the  Contingenf  contour,  where  only  37 
percent  were  full-time.  Despite  educational  attainment  that  was  almost  a  year  and 
a  half  greater  (12.8  compared  to  11.4)  the  average  hourly  wage  in  the  Routine 
White-Collar  contour  was  just  70  percent  of  the  High-Wage  Blue-Collar  wage 
($5.24,  compared  to  $7.44).  Not  surprisingly,  75%  of  Routine  White-Collar  job 
holders  were  female,  compared  to  just  15%  of  High-Wage  Blue-Collar  employees. 
Both  unionization  and  health  insurance  coverage  were  also  highest  in  the  High- 
Wage  Blue-Collar  contour. 
Using  this  classification  scheme,  we  find  a  dramatic  restructuring  of  employment 
since  1973,  with  most  of  the  change  concentrated  in  the  1979-83  period.  Figure  6 
shows  that  the  subordinate  primary  segment  declined  by  4  percentage  points  between 
1979  and  1990  (most  of  which  was  accounted  for  by  the  High-Wage  Blue-Collar 
contour),  while  the  independent  primary  segment  has  grown  rapidly  since  1973,  rising 
from  about  25  to  32  percent  of  the  workforce  (accounted  for  almost  entirely  by  the 
Private  I-P contour).  In  contrast  employment  in  the  secondary  segment  has  remained 
virtually  unchanged  between  1979  and  1990.  In  fact,  unlike  the  1979-83  period,  there 
was  virtually  no  change  in  employment  shares  between  1987  and  1990.  Since  the 
transformation  to  “high  performance”  workplaces  was  presumably  more  prevalent  in 
the  later  period,  the  timing  of  these  changes  lends  little  support  to  the  skill  mismatch -  27  - 
thesis  that  technological  advances  have  led  to  a  drop  in  low-skill,  low-wage  job 
opportunities  on  a  scale  large  enough  to  cause  a  major  restructuring  of  the  wage 
distribution. 
Since  the  wage  collapse  was  concentrated  among  low-skill  men,  and  because  the 
skill  mismatch  story  focuses  on  declining  job  opportunities  for  these  workers,  a  more 
revealing  indicator  of  employment  restructuring  might  be  male  employment  by 
segment  presented  as  a  share  of  the  total  male  population.  This  measure  is  reported 
for  the  three  job  segments  for  1973-90  in  Figure  7.  The  trends  are  quite  similar  to 
those  reported  in  Figure  6.  The  Figure  shows  substantial  shifts  in  job/population  ratios 
between  1973  and  1983  and  remarkable  stability  between  1983  and  1990.  Whereas 
job  opportunities  for  men  were  about  the  same  in  each  of  the  three  segments  in  1979, 
by  1983  there  were  far  fewer  jobs  per  capita  in  the  middle  (the  subordinate  primary 
segment)  than  at  the  top  (independent  primary)  or  bottom  (secondary).  The  post-1982 
period  has  been  characterized  by  a  very  gradual  continuation  of  this  “declining  middle” 
as  both  independent  primary  and  secondary  jobs  held  by  men  per  capita  expanded  at 
the  expense  of  the  subordinate  primary  segment.  In  sum,  Figures  6  and  7  show  that 
the  major  shifts  in  employment  among  the  three  job  segments  between  1979  and 
1983  did  not  characterize  the  1983-90  period.  Indeed,  the  magnitude  of  employment 
shifts  among  the  segments  clearly  decline  with  each  3-4  year  period  between  1979 
and  1990. 
Did  the  relative  stability  in  the  quantity  of  employment  in  the  1980’s  shown  in 
Figures  6  and  7  (and  Figure  5  and  Table  3  in  Section  2)  also  characterize  the  Quality 
of  jobs  in  the  low-skill  contours?  Figure  8  reports  that  average  real  wages  in  all  four 
low-skill  contours  declined  substantially  between  1979  and  1990.  In  the  two  secondary 
contours  most  of  the  drop  took  place  between  1979  and  1983.  Only  the  High-Wage 
Blue-Collar  contour  shows  large  and  persistent  declines  after  1983.  Whereas  Contin- 
gent  jobs  decline  by  about  2  percent  and  Routine  White  Collar  and  Low-Wage  Blue- 
Collar  jobs  fall  by  roughly  4  percent,  the  average  real  wage  in  the  High-Wage  Blue- 
Collar  contour  was  8  percent  smaller  in  1990  than  in  1983.  The  wage  restructuring  of 
low-skill  jobs  in  the  1980’s  appears  to  have  had  its  greatest  negative  effect  on  workers Figure  6: The  Distribution  of  Employment 
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in  relatively  high-wage  jobs. 
Declines  in  quality  can  be  seen  in  other  indicators  as  well.  For  example,  the  share 
of  workers  with  employer  provided  health  insurance  fell  in  all  six  contours,  but  the 
greatest  declines  were  in  the  blue-collar  and  contingent  contours:  coverage  in  the 
High-Wage  Blue-Collar  contour  fell  from  83.6%  to  72.8%,  while  coverage  declined 
from  56%  to  42%  in  the  Low-Wage  Blue-Collar  contour  and  from  33%  to  25%  in  the 
Contingent  contour.  For  each  of  these  contours,  the  decline  in  the  share  of  workers 
covered  by  health  insurance  was  greater  between  1983  and  1988  than  between  1979 
and  1983  (Howell  and  Gittleman,  1993,  Figure  8). 
These  results  indicate  that  the  employment  restructuring  that  took  place  in  the 
1980’s  had  two  main  features.  First,  as  Bluestone  and  Harrison  (1986)  and  others 
have  argued,  there  was  a  sharp  decline  in  the  middle  of  the  job  structure  for  men, 
which  took  place  largely  between  1979  and  1983.  There  was  little  change  in  the  share 
of  both  subordinate  primary  and  secondary  jobs  after  1983,  suggesting  that  opportu- 
nities  for  low-skill,  low-wage  jobs  did  not  decline  much  during  the  1980’s,  and  certainly 
did  not  decline  at  an  increasing  rate.  Second,  the  quality  of  subordinate  primary  and 
secondary  jobs,  as  measured  by  earnings  and  health  benefits,  fell  in  both  absolute 
and  relative  terms  throughout  this  decade.  These  developments  appear  more  consis- 
tent  with  an  explanation  of  recent  wage  trends  that  emphasizes  a  concern  throughout 
the  1980’s  with  labor  costs  (shifting  wage  norms)  than  one  that  focuses  primarily  on 
shifts  in  skill  requirements  caused  by  computer-based  technological  progress. 
4. Towards  an  Alternative  Story:  The  ‘Restructuring*  of  Wage  Norms 
An  enormous  research  effort  has  been  made  to  try  to  understand  the  severe 
deterioration  in  the  earnings  status  of  low-skilled  workers  in  the  1980’s.  Surveying  this 
literature,  Levy  and  Murnane  (1992)  concluded  that  we  do  not  yet  have  the  data  to 
provide  an  entirely  satisfactory  answer.  But  we  do  know  that  it  was  primarily  changes 
in  wage  rates  within  industry  and  education  groups  that  led  to  the  rise  in  inequality 
and  that  the  greatest  declines  in  wages  took  place  among  those  with  the  least  educa- 
tional  attainment  -  although  as  noted  above,  it  should  be  remembered  that  the -  29  - 
incidence  of  low  earnings  grew  substantially  among  black  and  Hispanic  male  college 
graduates  as  well. 
If  the  evidence  does  not  provide  much  support  for  the  technology-induced  skill 
mismatch  explanation,  why  did  the  wages  of  low-skill  men  collapse?  The  remainder 
this  sections  sketches  an  alternative  story  -  one  that  is  multifaceted  and  in  need  of 
of 
much  more  analysis,  but  one  that  also  seems  broadly  consistent  with  the  evidence. 
My  point  of  departure  is  that  it  was  less  the  production  technology  than  the  labor 
relations  policies  adopted  by  management  that  has  undergone  a  radical  change. 
Faced  with  increasingly  competitive  product  markets,  a  growing  supply  of  workers 
willing  to  accept  very  low-wage  jobs,  favorable  government  policies  and  a  pro-market 
ideological  climate,  private  sector  firms  revamped  their  employment  and  wage-setting 
practices,  eroding  the  barriers  to  the  full  force  of  labor  market  competition  that  had 
protected  low-skill  workers.  Although  many  firms  may  not  have  had  a  real  choice  - 
small  subcontractors,  for  example  (Harrison  and  Kelley,  1991)  -  most  U.S.  firms 
appear  to  have  taken  “low-road”  (see  Appelbaum,  1992). 
This  “shift  in  wage  norms”  story  has  two  main  parts:  1)  declining  demand  -  lower 
wage  offers  to  the  same  or  similar  workers  for  the  same  or  similar  work  through  wage 
concessions,  relocation,  outsourcing  and  the  use  of  contingent  workers,  all  of  which 
were  facilitated  by  the  eroding  role  of  protective  wage-setting  institutions  (labor  laws, 
labor  unions,  and  the  minimum  wage),  and  2)  increasing  supply  -  the  crowding  of 
secondary  labor  market  due  to  displacement  of  higher-wage  workers  and  the  growth  of 
low-skill  immigrant  labor  supply. 
4.1  Declining  Demand:  Lower  Wages  For  Similar  Work 
The  following  passages  portray  the  fundamental  shift  in  managements  approach  to 
labor  relations  that  began  in  the  late  1970’s.  In  the  Brookinqs  Paoers,  Daniel  Mitchell 
(1985589-90)  describes  the  increasingly  confrontational  approach  of  employers: 
“the  longevity  of  the  (wage)  concession  movement  and  its  spread  to 
less-than-dire  situations  suggest  that  the  initial  concessions  have  encour- 
aged  other  employers  to  try  their  luck  in  demanding  similar  settle- 
ments....  Management,  cheered  by  what  is  perceived  as  a  shift  in  the -  30  - 
balance  of  power,  has  changed  its  bargaining  goals....  The  political  and 
legal  climate  change  has  been  reflected  in  a  greater  willingness  of  man- 
agement  to  take  actions  in  labor  disputes  that  might  not  have  been 
publicly  or  politically  acceptable  in  the  past...  Even  firms  with  a  long 
history  of  unionization  are  using  nonunion  labor.” 
At  the  end  of  the  decade,  Michael  Wachter  and  William  Carter  (1989:253-4)  also  in 
The  Brookinqs  Paoers,  refer  to  a  fundamental  shift  in  human  resource  policies  within 
firms  as  well  as  the  legal  rules  governing  employment  practices: 
“Until  the  late  1970’s  or  1980’s,  firms  rarely  made  use  of  their  rights 
under  Mackay  Radio to  hire  permanent  replacements.  Instead,  firms 
used  managers  to  replace  striking  workers  temporarily.  When  replace- 
ment  workers  were  hired,  they  were  seldom  offered  permanent  jobs. 
When  strikes  occur  today,  replacement  workers  are  more  likely  to  be 
offered  permanent  jobs....  The  rules  governing  plant  closings  and  reloca- 
tion  are  based  on  newer  decisions....  In  simple  terms,  the  rules  mean 
that  management  decisions  to  implement  partial  plant  closing,  work 
relocation,  asset  sales,  and  even  some  types  of  subcontracting  are  not 
mandatory  topics  (for  bargaining).” 
At  the  end  of  the  1970’s,  firms  begain  to  fundamentally  reassess  their  employ- 
ment  and  wage-setting  practices.  Large  integrated  (high  wage)  firms  began  to  down- 
size  and  rely  more  heavily  on  low-wage  suppliers.  Advances  in  telecommunications 
and  transportation  facilitated  the  relocation  of  lower-skilled  operations  to  low-wage 
sites,  leaving  behind  a  core  of  permanent,  relatively  skilled  employees  supplemented 
(often  heavily)  by  part-time  and  temporary  workers.  Central  to  this  part  of  the  strategy 
has  been  an  uncompromising  attack  on  the  “middle”  -  typically  those  blue-collar 
workers  with  relatively  low  cognitive  skills  taking  home  middle-class  paychecks. 
Consistent  with  this  perspective,  Borjas  and  Ramey  (1993)  have  argued  that 
much  of  the  increase  in  earnings  inequality  in  the  1980’s  can  be  traced  to  the  erosion 
of  “rents”  earned  by  low-skilled  workers  in  concentrated  industries  -  an  erosion  they 
attribute  to  increased  foreign  competition  in  durable  manufacturing.  They  show  that 
trade  competitiveness  in  this  sector  has  closely  mirrored  trends  in  wage  inequality 
since  the  1970’s.  A  recent  study  by  Papadakis  (1993)  underscores  the  role  of  durable 
goods  industries  in  the  worsening  of  the  trade  balance  in  the  early  1980’s.  She  reports 
that  the  trade  balance  shifted  from  a  $3.6  billion  surplus  in  1982  to  a  $67.8  billion -31  - 
deficit  just  two  years  later.  By  1987  the  manufacturing  trade  deficit  rose  to  $125  billion 
(1993:7).  She  attributes  about  55  percent  of  the  increase  in  the  trade  deficit  to  four 
durable  goods  industries:  motor  vehicles  (24.5%)  nonelectrical  machinery  (14.7%) 
electronic  equipment  (9.7%)  and  electrical  machinery  (5.5%)  (1993:Table  2)” 
In  an  innovative  study,  Galbraith  and  Calmon  group  manufacturing  industries  into 
six  clusters  based  on  wage  growth  from  1958  to  1988  and  estimate  the  fit  between 
average  cluster  wages  and  trade  performance.  He  finds  no  association  in  1960,  a 
much  closer  fit  in  1980,  and  by  1987  finds  that  “the  alignment  of  trade  and  wages  had 
become  remarkably  precise”  (1993:28).  He  also  presents  evidence  suggesting  that 
wage  trends  in  the  service  industries  often  move  in  tandem  with  selected  manufactur- 
ing  industries.  “For  example,  we  see  that  wages  in  garment-related  service  trades, 
such  as  men  and  women’s  clothing,  department  stores  and  shoe  stores,  and  even 
laundries,  appear  to  move  with  wages  in  textiles  .  .  .  while  wages  in  grocery  stores 
move  nearly  alongside  wages  in  bakeries  and  breweries”  (1993:30-31). 
The  role  of  foreign  trade  as  a  determinant  of  skill  restructuring,  declining  wages, 
and  earnings  inequality  remains  controversial.  Berman,  Bound  and  Griliches  (1993:33) 
conclude  their  study  by  stating  that  “What  our  results  do  not  suggest  is  that  the  bulk  of 
skill  upgrading  that  occurred  within  manufacturing  can  be  attributed  to  trade.”  Krugman 
and  Lawrence  (1993)  come  to  the  same  conclusion  concerning  earnings  trends.  Their 
argument  is  that  the  magnitude  of  the  trade  deficits  are  simply  not  sufficient  to  account 
for  observed  employment  and  earnings  trends,  even  in  manufacturing.  These  studies, 
however,  focus  exclusively  on  what  is  measurable  -  various  indicators  of  import 
penetration  and  export  shares.  But  it  seems  likely  that  much  of  the  employment  and 
earnings  shifts  by  U.S.  firms  since  the  late  1970’s  were  based  on  a  perception  of  a 
growing  competitive  threat.  For  instance,  with  numerous  quotes  from  executives, 
Louis  Utchitelle  (New  York  Times,  7/26/93:Al)  has  reported  recently  that  many  leading 
I2  Curiously,  however,  figure  5  above  showed  that  all  of  the  employment 
restructuring  in  the  durable  goods  industries  took  place  prior  to  1983.  This  would  be 
an  important  area  for  future  research. -  32  - 
corporations  have  been  downsizing  by  reducing  both  production  and  white-collar 
workers,  not  because  of  current  weakness,  but  because  it  is  widely  understood  to  be 
necessary  to  remain  competitive  in  the  late  1990’s.13  By  the  time  the  trade  data  are 
published,  the  competitive  battle  -  if  not  the  war  -  has  already  been  lost.  Similarly,  the 
passage  of  new  trade  agreements  such  as  NAFTA  can  affect  the  bargaining  power  - 
and  wages  -  of  workers  well  before  the  trade  statistics  show  any  change.” 
While  the  extent  to  which  various  measures  of  foreign  trade  can,  or  should  be 
expected  to,  account  for  skill  or  wage  restructuring  will  no  doubt  remain  controversial, 
there  appears  to  be  widespread  agreement  that  competitive  pressures  have  increased 
throughout  the  economy,  and  that  this  has  led  to  a  heightened  concern  with  labor 
costs.  A  great  deal  of  evidence  suggests  that  low  labor  cost  strategies  by  employers, 
not  declining  demand  due  to  the  rapid  diffusion  of  new  technology,  is  the  main  source 
of  the  rising  incidence  of  low  earnings.  Concession  bargaining  became  widespread  by 
the  mid  1980’s.  Mitchell  (1985:Table  1)  shows  that  the  proportion  of  workers  under 
major  private  union  settlements  whose  wages  were  frozen  or  cut  ranged  from  0  to  5 
from  1964  through  1980,  rose  to  8  percent  in  1981,  jumped  to  44  percent  in  1982,  and 
was  37  percent  in  1983,  23  percent  in  1984  and  26  percent  in  1985.  Just  2  percent  of 
settlements  had  no  first-year  wage  increase  was  in  1981,  but  this  figure  rose  to  12 
percent  in  1982  and  ranged  from  25  to  37  percent  between  1983  and  1988  (Mitchell, 
1989:Table  14). 
I3  Uchitelle  writes  that  “the  recent  announcement  by  Procter  &  Bamble  that  it, 
too,  will  shrink  its  work  force  called  attention  to  a  surprising  aspect  of  America’s  jobs 
crisis:  profitable  companies  with  booming  sales  are  also  shedding  jobs,  insisting  that 
to  survive  the  1990’s,  they  must  prepare  for  the  worst.” 
”  According  to  Shaiken  (1993:63),  a  recent  Wall  Street  Journal  poll  found  that 
“one-quarter  of  almost  500  corporate  executives  polled  admitted  that  they  are  either 
‘very  likely’  or  ‘somewhat  likely’  to  use  NAFTA  as  a  bargaining  chip  to  hold  down 
wages.  About  40  percent  indicated  that  they  might  move  at  least  some  production  to 
Mexico  within  the  next  several  years.”  It  seems  likely  that  this  response  by  employers 
had  little  to  do  with  the  widely  heralded  (by  economists)  rise  in  the  demand  for  skill, 
but  a  lot  to  do  with  wage  rates. -  33  - 
Downsizing  often  works  in  tandem  with  wage  concessions.  General  Motors  has 
recently  agreed  to  sell  most  of  its  ownership  in  three  parts  plants  employing  some 
2000  employees.  These  workers,  currently  covered  by  a  UAW  contract  that  guaran- 
tees  them  the  same  wage  as  assembly  line  workers,  will  have  to  negotiate  a  separate 
agreement  with  the  new  company  at  the  end  of  the  contract,  virtually  guaranteeing 
wage  concessions  in  the  near  future  (New  York  Times,  Nov  24,  1993:03). 
The  relocation  of  operations  to  low-wage  sites  has  also  had  a  downward  effect  on 
the  relative  earnings  of  many  low-skill  workers.  The  anecdotal  evidence  is  overwhelm- 
ing.  For  example,  according  to  spokespersons  of  Pratt  and  Whitney,  the  firm’s  decision 
to  relocate  as  many  as  9,000  high  paying  production  jobs  from  a  high  skill  state  (Con- 
necticut)  to  lower  skill  states  (Maine  and  Georgia)  was  expressly  designed  to  reduce 
labor  costs  (New  York  Times,  April  15,  1993:  Al).  There  has  been  no  mention  of  a 
role  played  by  new  workplace  technologies  in  this  relocation.  Similarly,  to  reduce  labor 
costs,  Grumman’s  manufacturing  operations  are  now  being  transferred  from  Long 
Island  to  Florida  and  Louisianna  (NYT,  1/18/94:B6).  Another  recent  New  York  Times 
report  (July  18,  1993:Al)  documents  the  substantial  demand  for  extremely  low-skilled 
labor  in  the  1980’s  in  Saipan  and  other  U.S.  owned  islands  in  the  South  Pacific  where 
some  20,000  workers,  recruited  primarily  from  mainland  China,  typically  put  in  six 
a  week  for  half  the  minimum  wage  making  American  brand-name  clothes.  As  this 
demand  for  low-skilled  workers  willing  to  accept  poverty-level  wages  expanded  in 
these  offshore  U.S  territories  in  the  1980s  low-skill  but  living-wage  garment  jobs 
decreased  in  the  continental  United  States. 
days 
Another  way  to  reduce  labor  costs  is  to  substitute  part-time  and  temporary  workers 
for  permanent  full-time  workers.  The  temporary  help  industry  grew  eight  times  faster 
than  employment  in  all  nonagricutural  industries  between  1978  and  1985  and  in- 
creased  from  620,500  in  1984  to  1,031,500  in  1989  (Carre,  1992:45,  Table  1).  Based 
on  Katherine  Abraham’s  estimate  from  an  employer  survey  that  there  were  1.5  million 
temporary  help  workers,  short  term  hires,  and  on-call  workers  in  1986,  Carre  estimates 
that  there  were  over  2  million  of  these  “contingent”  workers  by  1989.  Relying  largely 
on  the  work  of  Osterman  (1988)  and  Golden  and  Appelbaum  (1990),  Carre  (1992:75) -  34  - 
concludes  that  it  is  “changes  in  firm  demand  for  labor  rather  than  changes  in  workers’ 
preferences  (that)  have  driven  the  rapid  growth  of  contingent  labor  in  the  1980’s.”  She 
also  points  out  that  not  only  do  contingent  workers  offer  lower  labor  costs,  but  they 
add  flexibility  -  managment  gains  greater  control  over  work  schedules  and  the  way 
tasks  are  performed? 
The  consequence  of  wage  concessions,  plant  relocations,  outsourcing  and  an 
increased  reliance  on  contingent  workers  is,  as  Bennett  Harrison  (1993)  has  described 
it,  a  job  structure  that  is  being  transformed  from  one  with  a  diamond  shape,  with  lots 
of  good,  relatively  low-skilled  jobs,  to  one  with  an  hourglass  shape,  in  which  only  the 
best  and  worst  jobs  are  expanding.  Levy  and  Murnane’s  survey  confirms  this  conclu- 
sion.  In  their  words,  “the  male  earnings  distribution  has  ‘hollowed  out,’  leaving  larger 
percentages  of  workers  at  the  top  and  bottom  of  the  distribution,  and  a  smaller 
percentage  in  the  middle”  (1992:1371).  This  is  also  confirmed  by  Figures  6  and  7,  in 
which  independent  primary  jobs  have  expanded,  subordinate  primary  jobs  have 
declined,  and  secondary  jobs  have  remained  roughly  constant  since  the  late  1970’s. 
To  fundamentally  alter  traditional  employment  and  wage-setting  practices  within 
the  firm,  various  institutional  changes  were  necessary.  Those  most  focused  upon  by 
the  literature  have  been  union  power  and  the  value  of  the  minimum  wage.  Blackbum, 
Bloom  and  Freeman  (1990)  have  shown  that  changes  in  union  density  and  the  value 
of  the  minimum  wage  can  be  shown  to  be  statistically  associated  with  the  decline  in 
the  relative  wages  of  low-skilled  men.  In  a  study  that  attempts  to  account  only  for 
changes  in  wage  inequality  in  the  U.S.,  DiNardo,  Fortin  and  Lemieux  (1993)  present 
striking  evidence  on  the  central  role  played  by  the  declining  value  of  the  minimum 
wage  on  the  collapse  of  wages  at  the  bottom  of  the  wage  distribution.  They  show  that 
between  1979  and  1988  “the  lower  tail  (of  the  wage  distribution)  grew  significantly 
fatter  over  the  period.  Most  of  this  fattening  occurred  in  the  area  between  the  old 
”  According  to  a  recent  Wall  Street  Journal  report,  “In  1992,  temporary  jobs 
accounted  for  about  two-thirds  of  new  private-sector  jobs...  When  taken  together, 
temporary,  contract  and  part-time  workers  now  make  up  about  25  percent  of  the 
workforce”  (WSJ,  3/l  1/93:Al) -  35  - 
(higher)  1979  federal  minimum  wage  and  the  lower  1988  minimum”  (1993:9)  and 
conclude  that  “labor  market  institutions  are  at  least  as  important  as  supply  and 
demand  considerations  in  explaining  changes  in  he  U.S.  distribution  of  wages  from 
1973  to  1992”  (1993:31). 
In  another  paper,  DiNardo  and  Lemieux  (undated)  have  compared  wage  inequality 
trends  in  Canada  and  the  U.S.  in  the  1980’s.  Despite  similar  labor  markets,  wage 
inequality  grew  rapidly  in  the  U.S.  but  not  in  Canada.  Dinardo  and  Lemieux  find  that 
“during  this  period,  union  density  fell  precipitously  in  the  United  States  but  declined 
very  little  in  Canada.  Similarly,  the  real  minimum  wage  declined  by  23  percent  in  the 
United  States  but  by  only  12  percent  in  Canada...  we  find  that  unions  and  the  mini- 
mum  wage  accounted  for  80  percent  of  the  difference  in  the  growth  of  inequality  in  the 
two  countries.”  Confirming  Katz,  Loveman  and  Blanchflower’s  (1993)  conclusion  that 
unions  and  the  minimum  wage  helped  explain  the  different  experiences  of  France  (low 
inequality  growth)  and  Great  Britain  (increasing  wage  inequality)  during  this  period,  the 
authors  conclude  that  their  findings  underline  “the  enormous,  though  neglected,  role  of 
labor  market  institutions  in  explaining  the  very  different  changes  in  wage  inequality 
across  countries.” 
The  undermining  of  traditional  wage-setting  institutions  may  have  also  tended  to 
increase  within-group  (gender-education-experience)  wage  inequality.  While  the 
conventional  view  is  that  technological  change  has  increased  the  demand  for  skill, 
leading  to  an  increased  premium  for  “unobserved  skills”  within  these  demographic 
groups,  it  may  be  that  the  de-institutionalization  of  the  labor  market  has  had  a  greater 
effect.  Wage  norms  appear  to  have  broken  down  within  firms  (as  internal  labor 
markets  are  opened  up  to  external  competition),  within  industies  (as  increasing 
competition  causes  differences  among  firms  to  become  a  more  critical  factor  in  wage 
outcomes)  and  amonq  communities  (as  transportation  and  telecommunications 
facilitate  the  relocation  of  some,  but  not  all,  firms  to  lower  wage  areas).  In  short,  the 
“law  of  one  price”  may  have  been  undermined,  not  promoted,  by  the  recent  wage 
restructuring.  Take,  for  example,  the  airline  industry:  With  deregulation  “Employees  at 
smaller  carriers  like  Republic  actually  saw  their  pay  go  up  when  bigger  airlines,  like -  36  - 
Northwest,  took  them  over  and  brought  in  higher  wage  scales.  But  many  have  felt  the 
pain  as  the  competition  set  off  by  deregulation  put  relentless  pressures  on  costs...” 
(NYT,  12/12/93:  F5). 
Another  important,  but  neglected,  area  of  research,  concerns  the  impact  of  govern- 
ment  social  policy  on  the  undermining  of  traditional  wage-setting  norms  in  the  private 
sector.  The  U.S.  continues  to  rely  heavily  on  employers  to  provide  health  insurance, 
pensions,  child  care,  and  other  fundamental  benefits  -  benefits  that  appear  as  labor 
costs  to  employers.  These  costs  are  assumed  by  the  public  sector  in  most  other 
developed  countries.  As  the  costs  of  benefits  rise,  our  “privatized”  benefits  system 
encourages  employers  to  substitute  part-time  and  temporary  low-wage  jobs,  increasing 
both  the  share  of  low  earners  and  wage  inequality. 
4.2  Increasing  Supply:  The  Crowding  of  Secondary  Labor  Markets 
Traditional  measures  of  labor  supply  -  the  number  of  workers  in  a  particular  age- 
gender-education  group  -  suggests  that  there  was  no  significant  increase  in  the  low- 
skill  labor  supply  in  the  1980’s  (Katz  and  Murphy,  1993).  However,  part  of  the  decline 
in  bargaining  power  that  contributed  to  the  wage  collapse  may  be  traceable  to 
“unmeasured”  increases  in  the  supply  of  workers  willing  (or  required)  to  compete  for 
low-wage  jobs. 
As  the  middle  of  the  earnings  structure  narrowed,  low-skill  workers  have  crowded 
into  a  pool  of  “secondary”  jobs  that  remained  a  fairly  constant  share  of  total  jobs 
throughout  the  1980’s,  tending  to  lower  the  wages  of  what  were  already  the  worst  jobs 
in  the  labor  market.  According  to  a  recent  Department  of  Labor  study  (Her-z,  1991) 
more  than  4.3  million  workers  were  displaced  during  the  boom  years  of  198589.16 
Only  72  percent  had  been  re-employed  by  January  1990  and  of  these,  about  10 
percent  worked  part-time.  Among  those  re-employed  full-time,  about  40  percent 
earned  less  in  current  dollars  than  on  their  previous  job.  Not  surprisingly,  those  least 
l6  The  study  defines  displacement  as  “job  loss  due  to  plant  closings  or  moves, 
slack  work,  or  the  abolishment  of  their  positions  or  shifts.” -  37  - 
successful  in  the  labor  market  after  displacement  were  high-wage  blue-collar  men. 
According  to  Herz  (1991:7)  “Six  of  every  10  displaced  workers  in  this  industry  (trans- 
portation  equipment)  earned  less  on  their  new  jobs  than  on  their  old  one,  and  more 
than  half  of  this  group  suffered  declines  of  20  percent  or  more.” 
The  downward  effect  of  displaced  high-wage  low-skill  workers  on  the  wages  at  the 
bottom  of  the  earnings  distribution  can  also  be  inferred  from  research  by  Robert  Topel 
(1993:113).  Between  1979  and  1988,  he  finds  that  “nearly  one-third  of  the  unemployed 
had  predisplacement  wages  above  the  60th  percentile,  and  only  14  percent  are  from 
the  bottom  decile....  Among  displaced  workers  with  prior  earnings  from  the  upper  four 
deciles,  current  wages  are  about  half  of  their  predisplacement  level.”  Defining  the 
unskilled  as  those  with  low  wages,  Topel  (p.  110)  interprets  his  results  as  showing  that 
“Many  of  the  ‘unskilled’  who  are  unemployed  or  out  of  the  labor  force  appear  to  have 
been  high-wage  workers  whose  specialized  skills  have  become  obsolete.“” 
Despite  the  rising  averaoe  premium  for  a  college  degree  relative  to  a  high  school 
degree  in  the  1980’s,  a  weak  job  market  has  forced  many  lower-level  white-collar 
workers  with  college  degrees  to  compete  for  relatively  low-skilled  jobs.  This  became 
particularly  pronouncd  at  the  end  of  decade,  in  the  “white-collar  recession”  of  1990-91. 
Like  the  displacement  of  high-wage  blue-collar  workers  earlier  in  the  decade,  this 
weakening  in  the  middle  of  the  earnings  distribution  added  to  the  supply  of  workers 
competing  in  the  low-skill  job  market.18  There  is  abundant  evidence  that  wmputer- 
”  High-wage  blue-collar  workers  were  certainly  hard  hit  by  the  1980’s,  but  there  is 
no  evidence  that  these  were  workers  with  specialized  skills  or  that  their  skills  became 
obsolete  at  a  rate  that  was  substantially  greater  than  in  earlier  decades. 
‘*  This  does  not  necessarily  conflict  with  the  evidence  that  the  return  to  college 
education  rose  sharply  in  the  1980’s.  While  growth  in  the  “redundant”  portion  of  the 
college  educated  labor  supply  will  tend  to  reduce  the  absolute  value  of  this  return, 
increasing  earnings  by  the  unaffected  (higher  skill)  part  of  the  college  educated  pool 
could  more  than  offset  this  effect.  Furthermore,  the  increasing  competition  for  lower 
skill  jobs  by  the  redundant  college  educated  workforce  will  also  tend  to  lower  the  wage 
of  those  with  low  educational  attainment.  A  large  part  of  the  growth  in  the  wage  gap 
between  college  and  high  school  degree  holders  was  due  to  the  decline  in  the 
earnings  of  the  latter  (see  Table  1). -  38  - 
based  technologies  and  corporate  restructuring  have  made  large  numbers  of  middle- 
level  managers  redundant.  As  mentioned  above,  regression  results  suggest  that  the 
use  of  new  technology  had  a  downward  effect  on  the  share  of  both  managers  and 
clerical  workers  between  1970  and  1985  (Howell  and  Wolff,  1992).  Consistent  with  this 
finding,  Kuster’s  (1993)  case  study  of  the  commercial  banking  industry  found  that 
between  1987  and  1990  there  was  a  13  percent  decline  (from  45,000  to  39,000)  in 
general  managers,  a  decline  from  2.9  percent  to  2.5  percent  of  total  industry  employ- 
ment. 
In  support  of  this  twist  in  the  skill  mismatch  story,  data  from  the  Panel  Study  of 
Income  Dynamics  (PSID)  show  that  in  the  late  1970’s  about  40  percent  of  the  sample 
reported  themselves  to  be  “over-educated”  for  their  jobs  (Sicherman,  1989).  According 
to  recent  reports  by  economists  from  the  U.S.  Labor  Department,  throughout  the 
1980’s  about  20%  of  college  graduates  were  working  at  jobs  that  don’t  normally 
require  a  degree,  and  this  is  expected  to  increase  to  30%  at  the  end  this  decade 
(Hecker,  1992;  Shelley,  1992).  Declining  opportunities  in  the  middle  of  the  job  ladder 
might  be  expected  expected  to  have  the  greatest  negative  impact  on  minority  workers. 
In  fact,  the  share  of  black  and  Hispanic  college  graduates  with  poverty-level  wages 
rose  dramatically  in  this  decade,  from  about  9  percent  to  just  under  15  percent.  If  the 
unemployed  and  those  who  had  stopped  looking  for  work  are  included,  the  incidence 
of  low  earnings  among  college  graduates  rose  from  14.6  percent  to  21.4%  for  black 
men  and  from  11  percent  to  19.4%  for  Hispanic  men  (Acs  and  Danziger,  1993).  It 
seems  reasonable  to  assume  that  one  consequence  of  declining  opportunities  for 
moderately  skilled  white-collar  jobs  has  been  to  force  those  with  training  for  white- 
collar  jobs  to  compete  for  jobs  with  low  cognitive  skill  requirements,  contributing  a 
downward  pressure  on  their  wages. 
Immigration  patterns  compounded  the  downward  effect  that  displaced  high-wage 
workers  had  on  the  wage  rates  of  low  cognitive  skill  jobs.  There  was  an  unprecedent- 
ed  increase  in  the  flow  of  low  skill  foreign  workers  into  the  U.S.  in  the  1980’s,  both 
legal  and  illegal.  According  to  Borjas,  Freeman  and  Katz  (1992.214-l  5)  the  combina- 
tion  of  rising  imports  and  growing  numbers  of  low-skilled  foreign  workers  had  substan- -  39  - 
tial  negative  effects  on  the  relative  earnings  of  native  low-skilled  workers.  The  authors 
concluded  that  “We  estimate  that  between  30%  and  50°r6  of  the  .  .  .  decline  in  the 
relative  weekly  wage  of  high  school  dropouts  from  1980  to  1988  can  be  attributed  to 
trade  and  immigration  flows.”  Case  study  evidence  supports  this  finding.  In  his  study 
of  the  Los  Angeles  restaurant  and  hotel  industry,  Waldinger  (1992)  concluded  that  “the 
story  of  black  displacement  in  restaurants  and  hotels  can  be  traced  not  to  skill 
upgrading,  but  rather  to  competition  with  a  rapidly  growing  immigrant  population.” 
Similarly,  a  General  Accounting  Office  study  cited  by  Jack  Miles  (Atlantic,  October 
1992)  found  that  “Janitorial  firms  serving  downtown  Low  Angeles  have  almost  entirely 
replaced  their  unionized  black  workforce  with  non-unionized  immigrants.”  Again,  it 
appears  to  have  been  labor  costs,  not  skill  restructuring,  that  explains  this  result. 
5.  Concluding  Remarks 
An  enormous  amount  of  empirical  research  has  been  undertaken  in  the  last  few 
years  to  describe  and  explain  the  sharp  rise  in  earnings  inequality  in  the  U.S.  since 
the  late  1970’s.  Most  studies  have  focused  on  the  growth  in  the  education  premium 
(e.g.,  the  college  to  high  school  wage  differential).  A  large  part  of  the  growth  in  this 
premium  can  be  attributed  to  the  collapse  in  the  real  wages  of  low-skill  men.  This 
paper  examines  alternative  explanations  for  this  wage  collapse.  Among  academic 
economists,  a  widely  accepted  story  is  that  the  decline  in  wages  for  low-skill  men 
reflects  declining  demand  (job  opportunities)  caused  primarily  by  biased  technological 
change.  This  explanation  has  the  great  advantage  of  being  both  simple  and  consistent 
with  the  most  elementary  labor  market  model  -  if  competitive  pressures  in  the  labor 
market  ensure  that  the  wage  distribution  reflects  the  skill  distribution,  a  decline  in  job 
opportunities  for  low-skill  workers  will  lower  their  wages. 
Unfortunately,  a  great  disadvantage  of  the  skill  mismatch  story  is  that  the  empirical 
evidence  does  not  provide  much  support  for  it.  The  evidence  presented  in  Sections  l- 
3  suggests  that  the  skill  and  wage  distributions  for  nonsupervisory  workers  do  not 
closely  correspond.  In  the  late  1970’s  over  one-fifth  of  nonsupervisory  workers  held 
high-wage,  low-skill,  blue-collar  jobs  (Gittleman  and  Howell,  1993:  Figure  1)  and  much -  40  - 
of  the  wage  restructuring  in  the  1980’s  was  at  their  expense.  Wage  concessions,  the 
outsourcing  of  parts  and  relocation  of  operations  to  low-wage  sites,  the  substitution  of 
contingent  for  permanent  workers,  and  other  employer  policies  aimed  at  reducing 
labor  costs  all  had  substantial  effects  on  relative  wage  trends  in  the  1980’s  but  did  not 
have  major  consequences  for  the  skill  mix.  The  recognition  of  the  key  role  played  by 
these  employment  practices  -  reflecting  a  major  shift  in  wage  norms  by  employers  - 
requires  that  the  labor  market  be  viewed  through  a  lense  that  does  not  automatically 
equate  wage  and  skill  levels. 
Equally  important,  while  substantial  shifts  in  the  skill  mix  of  employment  took  place 
between  1973  and  1983,  the  data  suggest  that  little  skill  restructuring  has  occurred 
since  1983.  Crucially,  however,  it  was  in  this  latter  period  that  we  observe  the  highest 
rates  of  investment  in  computer-based  technologies  by  firms  in  all  sectors  of  the 
economy.  Indeed,  the  source  of  the  problem  appears  to  be  just  the  reverse  of  that 
proposed  by  the  technology-induced  skill  mismatch  hypothesis:  in  the  face  of  mounting 
competition,  employers  have  reduced  unit  labor  costs  and  increased  flexibility  in  the 
production  process  by  following  the  “low  road”  -  lower  wages,  little  training,  and  fewer 
permanent  employees.  As  former  Labor  Secretary  Ray  Marshall  (1992:36)  has  put  it, 
“Since  the  early  1970’s,  U.S.  companies  have  been  competing  mainly  through 
reducing  domestic  wages  and  by  shifting  productive  facilities  to  low  wage  countries.” 
There  is  an  important  literature  that  does  not  attempt  to  explain  the  wage  collapse 
by  skill  restructuring;  it  consists  of  studies  that  explore  the  statistical  association 
between  changes  in  wage  inequality  and  a  variety  of  possible  determinants.  Based  in 
part  on  this  literature,  Section  4  outlined  a  “shifting  wage  norms”  explanation  in  which 
declining  demand  and  increasing  supply  account  for  the  wage  collapse.  But  in  this 
alternative  story,  declining  demand  reflects  the  adoption  of  more  confrontational,  low- 
wage  employment  practices  by  firms  rather  than  declines  in  low-skill  job  opportunities 
that  stem  from  technological  advances  in  the  workplace. 
The  policy  implications  of  these  two  explanations  are  quite  different.  If  the  rising 
incidence  of  low-wages  and  the  growth  of  earnings  inequality  over  the  last  two 
decades  can  be  attributed  to  declining  job  opportunities  for  low-skill  workers  due  to -41  - 
technological  change,  the  solution  is  straightforward:  we  must  increase  the  number 
and  quality  of  applicants  for  the  growing  pool  of  high  skilled  jobs.  The  answer,  in  short, 
is  a  supply-side  remedy  of  more  and  better  education  and  training.  Indeed,  the 
implication  of  the  mismatch  story  is  that  we  are  twenty  years  too  late:  a  choice  to 
invest  more  heavily  in  skills  back  in  the  1970’s  could  have  alleviated  the  skill  mismatch 
and  fundamentally  altered  the  course  of  future  earnings  trends.  Given  the  nature  and 
pace  of  technological  advances,  the  nation  effectively  “chose”  a  low-wage  path  by 
failing  to  invest  the  resources  necessary  to  increase  the  literacy  of  a  large  segment  of 
the  working  age  population. 
In  contrast,  raising  the  level  of  skills  that  workers  bring  to  the  workplace  is  not 
likely  to  reverse  the  recant  collapse  of  low-skill  male  earnings  if  the  main  source  of  the 
wage  restructuring  was  a  fundamental  shift  in  wage  norms  -  that  is,  if  firms  adopted 
low-wage  employment  practices  as  a  result  of  increasing  competitive  pressure,  a  shift 
in  the  ideological  climate,  and  a  variety  of  government  policies  (e.g.,  the  deregulation 
of  trucking  and  airlines  industries,  the  Federal  Government’s  breaking  of  the  Air 
Traffic  Controllers  Union,  the  character  of  the  appointments  made  to  the  National 
Labor  Relations  Board,  and  the  failure  to  pass  legislation  that  would  maintain  the  real 
value  of  the  minimum  wage).  As  the  costs  of  health  benefits  exploded,  the  continued 
reliance  on  employers  for  health  insurance  may  have  also  contributed  to  the  increase 
in  the  demands  made  by  firms  for  wage  concessions,  the  increasing  preference  of 
employers  for  part-time  and  temporary  workers  instead  of  permanent  employees,  and 
the  decisions  of  many  firms  to  relocate  operations  to  low-wage  anti-union  locations.  A 
shifting  wage  norms  explanation  suggests  that  reversing  the  declining  real  (and 
relative)  wages  of  low-skilled  workers  requires  public  policies  that  address,  not  just 
worker  characteristics,  but  the  way  wage-setting  institutions  work,  both  inside  and 
outside  the  firm. 
Few  will,  or  should,  oppose  the  Labor  Department’s  “get  smart”  policies  for 
workers,  but  the  reality  is  that  changes  in  the  ability  of  workers  to  provide  the  skills 
needed  in  technologically  advanced  workplaces  had  little  to  do  with  the  startling 
growth  in  poverty-wage  jobs,  the  drop  in  real  earnings,  and  the  growth  of  earnings -  42  - 
inequality  in  the  1980’s.  We  need  to  improve  our  education  and  training  system,  but 
making  workers  smarter  will  not,  by  itself,  have  much  impact  on  the  distribution  of 
earnings  -  certainly  not  in  the  next  decade.  Besides,  most  jobs  will  continue  to  require 
less  than  a  college  degree,  and  a  labor  market  that  increasingly  offers  poverty-wage 
jobs  to  these  workers  provides  them  with  little  incentive  to  invest  in  education  and 
training,  no  matter  how  well  we  design  and  implement  the  programs.  Equally  impor- 
tant,  low  wage  employment  strategies  and  high  levels  of  job  insecurity  are  an  unlikely 
recipe  for  developing  a  competitive  economy  of  high  performance  workplaces. 
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